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RANDOM DRUG TESTING OF STUDENT
ATHLETES BY STATE UNIVERSITIES IN
THE WAKE OF VON RAAB AND
SKINNER
LEROY PERNELL*
Looking back over the events of 1986, no occurrence in the world of
intercollegiate athletics evoked the concern and anguish of the public as
much as did the tragic death of Maryland basketball player Len Bias.1
During the height of celebration of his selection by the Boston Celtic profes-
sional basketball team, Bias died suddenly. The tragedy grew when it was
learned soon thereafter that his death was the probable result of cocaine
use.
The Bias death served as a catalyst for many institutions to intensify
their efforts to deal with the growing use of drugs among student athletes.
The concern over the use of drugs by student athletes did not begin, how-
ever, with the death of Len Bias.2 Ironically, much of the concern in the
past regarding the use of drugs by student-athletes centered around the use
of performance enhancing drugs such as steroids, which although ulti-
mately harmful, purport to make the athlete's performance better.3 There is
no such pretense regarding the use of the so-called recreational drugs such
as cocaine which are immediately harmful and performance impairing.
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sity, 1974; B.A., Franklin & Marshall College, 1971.
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1. Len Bias died on June 19, 1986. His death, and that of Cleveland Brown's defensive back
Don Rogers, on June 27, 1986, sparked strong public reaction. See Reilly, When the Cheers
Turned to Tears, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 14, 1986, at 28.
2. See Proper and Improper Use of Drugs by Athletes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Inves-
tigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973);
Note, Drugs, Athletes, and the NCAA: A Proposed Rule for Mandatory Drug Testing in College
Athletics, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 205 (1984); Looney, A Test with Nothing but Tough Questions,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 9, 1982.
3. Todd, The Steroid Predicament, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 1, 1983.
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This "new" crisis has encouraged many institutions, out of concern for
both the safety of the athletes and the welfare of the program, to take steps
that many might consider drastic.4 Random drug testing and screening are
among those used most frequently.' The concept of drug testing is depen-
dent upon the threat of unannounced tests as a means of deterring the stu-
dent-athlete from using drugs. There is evidence to support the notion that
the level of drug usage has in fact dropped in the wake of unannounced
drug testing.6
The pressure for drug testing is coming not only from the academic
arena, but from the federal government as well. The recommendations of
the President's Commission on Organized Crime "touched off an explosive
4. In March of 1986 the Big Ten Intercollegiate Conference discussed the following
resolutions:
A. A student-athlete may be subject to suspension or declared ineligible for competition
and/or loss of athletic financial aid:
1. If the student-athlete takes anabolic steroids or,
2. If the student-athlete takes any drug specified in NCAA Executive Regulation 1-7
without the knowledge of the Team Physician of the university.
B. No athletic department staff member shall dispense to student-athletes, or encourage
student-athletes to take a medication without prior specific approval from the team
physician.
C. To refer [B] to the Awareness Committee with the possibility of conducting a survey
to determine whether testing should be recommended for the athletic department
staff, and to analyze the extent of drug use among athletic department staff members.
Not all major institutions are in agreement with drug testing. Georgetown University has
announced that it is opposed to drug testing. See Washington Post, July 21, 1986, col. 5 (final
ed.).
5. The testing mechanism used most often for the random testing of student-athletes is urinal-
ysis. There are three widely employed urine testing mechanisms: (I) Thin Layer Chromatogra-
phy (TLC), (2) Radioimmunoassay (RIA), and (3) Enzyme immunoassay (EIA). Among the
array of enzyme immunoassay tests is the popular Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique
(EMIT). EMIT has become the predominate screening test because of its relative low cost. See
Black, Testing for Abused Drugs: A Primer for Executives, in DRUG TESTING: PROTECTION FOR
SOCIETY OR A VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (National Ass'n of State Personnel Executives, eds.
1987). Despite its low cost, the EMIT test is considered by many to have unacceptable levels of
reliability if not confirmed by a second test. See Morgan, Urine Testing for Abused Drugs: Tech-
nology and Problems, in DRUG TESTING: PROTECTION FOR SOCIETY OR A VIOLATION OF CIVIL
RIGHTS (National Ass'n of Personnel Executives, eds. 1987); Lundberg, Mandatory Unindicated
Urine Drug Screening: Still Chemical McCarthyism, 256 J. A.M.A. 3003 (1986); Lundberg, Urine
Drug Screening: Chemical McCarthyism, 287 NEW ENG. J. MED. 723 (1972).
A typical confirmatory test is the combined Gas-Liquid Chromatography (GC) and Mass
Spectrometry (MS). GC/MS provides greater sensitivity but is considerably more expensive. See
Black, supra. For a full discussion of urine testing techniques and relative strengths, see R.
CRAVEY & R. BASELT, INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC TOXICOLOGY (Biomedical Pub. 1981) and
Curran, Compulsory Drug Testing-the Legal Barriers, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 318 (1987).
6. See Columbus Dispatch, July 1, 1986, at El, col. 5.
1990] RANDOM DRUG TESTING
debate over the constitutionality of widespread drug testing."7 Even our
elementary and secondary school systems are not immune from the growing
outcry for the establishment of programs for the routine testing of drug
use.
8
The governing bodies of intercollegiate athletics have also joined in the
recent resurgence of interest in curbing drug use among student-athletes.
In 1984, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) executive
committee proposed a comprehensive drug testing program designed to
deal primarily with the problem of performance enhancing drugs.9 The
7. Mandatory Drug Testing in the Workplace, 72 A.B.A. J. 34 (Aug. 1986).
In one report, the Commission "called for the widespread drug testing of Americans by their
employers." Weiss, Watch Out: Urine Trouble, 56 HARPER'S MAG. at 452 (June 1986). The
Commission stated:
The President should direct the heads of all Federal agencies to formulate immediately
clear policy statements, with implementing guidelines, expressing the utter unacceptability
of drug abuse by Federal employees. State and local governments and leaders in the pri-
vate sector should support unequivocally a similar policy that any and all use of drugs is
unacceptable. Government contracts should not be awarded to companies that fail to im-
plement drug programs, including suitable drug testing. No Federal, State or local govern-
ment funds should go directly or indirectly to programs that counsel "responsible" drug
use or condone illicit drug use in any way. Laws in certain states which "decriminalized"
the possession of marijuana constitute a form of condonation, and should be reconsidered.
Id.
8. In the wake of the Bias death, some public education systems, particularly high schools,
either announced the intention to, or did implement the mandatory drug testing of students. In
Hawkins, Texas it was announced that students involved in the high school chorus, the marching
band, or the varsity football team, would have to pass a drug test prior to being allowed to partici-
pate in the activity. Texas School District to Test Students for Drugs, Hawkins Texas (August 18,
1986, Reuters Ltd).
In the heart of the conservative "Bible Belt," a school district in Franklin, Kentucky became
the first school district in Kentucky to announce that it would impose mandatory drug testing for
all athletes beginning in the Fall of 1986. Sports News, August 2, 1986.
Not all such actions by high schools have gone without legal challenge. In Gallatin, Tennes-
see, the local high school became the first high school in the state to drug test its athletes (81
football players). The American Civil Liberties Union almost immediately proclaimed that the
testing procedure violated the constitutional rights of the students. Sports News, July 31, 1986.
Despite protest to the contrary, increasing numbers of high school principals and coaches
apparently favor the testing of students in order to head off drug problems. Dallas Morning News,
August 3, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
Some schools have proposed or implemented the voluntary testing of students as an alterna-
tive. At Banning High School in Wilmington, California, a school known for its championship
football teams, a voluntary drug testing program was implemented beginning September of 1986,
by the Los Angeles school board. Los Angeles Times, August 12, 1986, Part 2 (Metro), at 6, col.
1 (Home ed.).
The issue of drug testing at the high school level raises many of the same issues presented by
drug testing at state universities. The age and legal incapacity of minors may raise additional
issues regarding the implementation of drug testing in a compulsory educational system. The
exploration of such issues, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
9. The NCAA resolution, No. 163, reads as follows:
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program became effective in the fall of 1986 and requires that all student-
athletes participating in NCAA championship play submit to a screening
for use of prohibited drugs. The tests are not only for performance enhanc-
ing drugs but also for "street drugs" such as cocaine. 10
While the NCAA program may well deter drug use for those athletes
who participate in post-season play, little control, if any, is placed on the
use of drugs at times other than championship play. To fill this void, indi-
vidual college athletic conferences are considering implementing drug test-
ing policies which would not be limited to post-season play. Within the Big
Ten conference, most universities already have some form of drug testing;
the majority developed such programs within recent years. 1 The primary
burden regarding the control of drug use among student-athletes falls on
the individual institutions. However, the decision to implement a drug test-
ing program is not an easy or uncomplicated one, particularly from a legal
standpoint.1 2
Whereas, the use of controlled substances and allegedly performance-enhancing drugs
presents a danger to the health of the students and a threat to the integrity of amateur
sports; Now, Therefore, Be It Resolved, that the NCAA Executive Committee be directed
to develop an ongoing program of drug testing to identify those students involved in inter-
collegiate athletics competition who have used either controlled or allegedly performance-
enhancing drugs; and Be It Further Resolved that the NCAA Executive Committee shall
inform each member of the Association of all details of the proposed testing program,
including a list of prohibited substances, before July 1, 1984; and Be It Further Resolved,
that the NCAA Executive Committee present the proposed program and legislation neces-
sary to implement it to the 1985 Convention. National Collegiate Athletic Association,
Res. 163 (1984 Convention).
The NCAA addressed the question of drug testing in 1973 when it authorized the Executive
Committee to approve drug testing methods to be used regarding those who participated in
NCAA championships. BYLAWS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, art. 5, sec. 2 (1973). That section provided in relevant part: "(b) The
Executive Committee may authorize methods for testing student-athletes who compete in NCAA
championships to determine the extent of drug usage therein." Id. Note, supra note 2, at 210-11.
10. The NCAA plan calls for the testing of athletes from member institutions "who compete
in NCAA Championships and certified post-season football contests." NCAA Executive Reg. 1,
sec. 7(a) (1986). Eighty substances are included in the testing protocol including psychomotor
stimulants (cocaine and amphetamines), sympathomimeticamines, miscellaneous central nervous
system stimulants, anabolic steroids, diuretics, street drugs (including heroin and marijuana), and
other substances banned for particular sports.
11. The University of Illinois, Indiana University, University of Michigan, Northwestern
University, Ohio State University, Purdue University and the University of Wisconsin, all have
some form of drug testing. Jauss, Drug Testing-a Hot Topic Among Big 10 Coaches, Chicago
Tribune, Aug. 4, 1986, at 6.
The Western Athletic Conference has also announced that it has established a committee to
formulate testing standards and punishments regarding athletes who use controlled substances or
performance enhancing drugs. United Press International, July 25, 1986 (press release).
12. In 1986, the Massachusetts chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union indicated that
it would seek legislation to ban the use of drug tests by employers without cause. American
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Much of the legal attention directed towards drug testing is on the con-
stitutional issues raised regarding the fourth amendment privacy issues as-
sociated with involuntary drug testing by the government or those
operating under color of state law. Recently, the United States Supreme
Court decided two significant cases involving drug testing in either public
or government-controlled employment."3 Although neither of these cases
involved random drug testing similar to the type in use at many universi-
ties, they do address significant issues of fourth amendment values.
This article will focus on the particularly complicated question of the
legality of drug testing at state universities. State universities comprise a
significant number of the universities involved in intercollegiate athletics at
the major conference level. The state university at the same time is a
branch of the state and operates under color of state law. As such, its ac-
tions fall under the additional scrutiny of the constitutional principles con-
tained in, and incorporated through, the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.
In examining the legal significance of drug testing of student-athletes at
a state university, this article will closely examine the announced drug test-
ing program at Ohio State University.14 The Ohio State program represents
one of the most comprehensive involuntary drug testing programs of stu-
dent-athletes by any state university.
This article goes beyond what has become the traditional focus of fourth
amendment scrutiny. It will explore additional issues concerning Due Pro-
cess associated with testing techniques and the imposition of sanctions, and
will explore Equal Protection issues which might be raised concerning the
testing of student-athletes only.
Medical News, July 18, 1986, at 1, col. 4. The drug testing clause of major league baseball play-
ers' contracts was declared unenforceable by a federal arbitrator in 1986. Associated Press, July
31, 1986. The National Football League Players' Association filed a grievance against similar
attempts made by the National Football League. Associated Press, July 9, 1986. See generally,
Note, An Analysis of Public College Athlete Drug Testing Programs Through the Unconstitutional
Condition Doctrine and the Fourth Amendment, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 815 (1987).
13. National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989),
involved an action brought by the Customs Service Employees' Union against the United States
Custom Service challenging the constitutionality of a drug testing program that required employ-
ees to undergo urinalysis when applying for promotions to job positions of a sensitive nature. The
other Supreme Court case, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct.
1402 (1989), considered the constitutionality of regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad
Administration requiring drug testing of railroad employees following the occurrence of certain
specified accidents.
14. See Appendix.
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND DRUG TESTING
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.15
With these words, the framers of the Constitution established vital soci-
etal goals and values. The fourth amendment was designed to protect bod-
ly integrity,16 privacy, 17 and property ownership18 by prohibiting general
and exploratory searches and seizures. 9 Judicial interpretation has consist-
ently recognized the need to impose restrictions on governmental intrusion
into these protected areas in both the criminal2" and civil context.21
Application of the fourth amendment to the actions of state universities
is initially governed by a determination of the existence of state action
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. A further determination
is made as to whether such action invades a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy protected by the fourth amendment.22
II. STATE ACTION AND STATE UNIVERSITIES
Whether the actions of state universities are to be considered state ac-
tion for fourth amendment purposes is best resolved by considering the
more general issue of whether the fourth amendment's application is lim-
ited to the activities of law enforcement officers or those performing a law
enforcement function.2 The issue was firmly resolved in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in New Jersey v. TL.O..24 TL.O. laid to rest the
suggestion that such intrusive conduct by state employees is free from
fourth amendment scrutiny.25 In that case, a teacher at a New Jersey high
15. U.S. CONsT. amend IV.
16. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
17. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
19. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 282 (1914).
20. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21. In the civil context, the Court has applied the fourth amendment in instances such as See
v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), and Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The
Court has also recognized that civil liability may flow directly from violations of the fourth
amendment. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The existence of civil
liability for fourth amendment violations in the context of state operated schools has long been
established. See Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
22. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353-58.
23. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.8 (2d ed. 1987).
24. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
25. The Court stated:
[Vol. 1:41
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school, 26 upon discovering the respondent smoking cigarettes in a school
lavatory, took her and her companion to the school office where a vice-
principal searched the student's purse. Marijuana, paraphernalia and other
It may well be true that the evil toward which the Fourth Amendment was primarily
directed was the resurrection of the pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants
of "writs of assistance" to authorize searches for contraband by officers of the Crown....
But this Court has never limited the Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures to operations conducted by the police. Rather, the Court has long spoken of
the Fourth Amendment's strictures as restraints imposed upon "governmental action" -
that is "upon the activities of sovereign authority .... " Because the individual's interest in
privacy and personal security "suffers whether the government's motivation is to investi-
gate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory standards," .... it would be
anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.
469 U.S. at 335 (citations omitted).
26. Traditionally, cases involving the application of constitutional principles to state operated
educational institutions have distinguished between institutions of higher education and public
schools at the high school or lower levels to the extent that the former often raise questions of the
rights of individual students in residential settings. As Professor LaFave notes, there are rare
exceptions to this analysis such as in the case of Keene v. Rodgers, 316 F. Supp. 217 (D. Me.
1970) which involved the search of a college student's car. W. LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 10.11(c),
at 178-82. Additionally, high school and elementary school searches often raise questions that are
inherent to the minority age group involved.
Public school authorities are often considered to be in loco parentids regarding minor children.
Under such a view, the parent is deemed to have delegated "part of his parental authority during
his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 453
(1870). This doctrine has been used by some courts to justify student searches as being outside the
fourth amendment on the grounds that the school may use its delegated authority to act as the
parent could to carry out a private search. Thus, in Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1970), the Texas court upheld the delinquency conviction of the appellant, who was sub-
jected to a search of his person by the principal. Noting that had the boy's father been called, he
would have made the appellant empty his pockets anyway, the court went on to hold that the
principal acted in loco parentis and therefore, the fourth amendment probable cause requirement
did not apply. Id. at 716-17. The use of the in locoparentis doctrine in this manner has now been
rejected by the United States Supreme Court in T.LO.:
Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court....
If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of free-
dom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be deemed
to be exercising parental rather than public authority when conducting searches of their
students.
469 U.S. at 336.
Even if the in locoparentis doctrine had some remaining viability regarding the application of
the fourth amendment, it would have no applicability to the activities of state colleges and univer-
sities. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 10.11(a), at 161.
The differences between public elementary/secondary schools and state colleges and universi-
ties are significant for fourth amendment analysis only to the extent that some light may be shed
on the meaning of "reasonableness" within the context of the fourth amendment. With regard to
the question of the fourth amendment application to non-law enforcement state action, the une-
quivocal language of T.L.O. applies across the board to all state run educational institutions.
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items were discovered in her purse, supporting the conclusion that the stu-
dent was involved in drug trafficking within the school.27
The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the activity of the
teacher and the vice principal was not state action28 and turned instead to
the question of whether the search activity invaded a legitimate expectation
of privacy, and if so, whether such an invasion was reasonable.29 The prob-
lem of student-athlete drug testing, however, raises an additional concern
not specifically addressed in TL.O.. Assuming that the actions of state uni-
versity officials are within the purview of the fourth amendment, as indi-
cated by the Court, is the random drug testing of students a "search" within
the meaning of the constitution?3"
III. DRUG TESTING AND THE "SEARCH" REQUIREMENT
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n 31 and National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab,32 have re-
solved what had previously been an undetermined issue; namely whether
drug testing by way of urine sample collection is a search protected by the
fourth amendment. In Skinner, the Court found that urine collection con-
stitutes an invasion of privacy interest even though no intrusion into the
body is involved.33 The privacy interest affected stems from the potential of
urinalysis to reveal private medical facts, and from the common practice of
27. 469 U.S. at 328.
28. Id. at 334-36.
29. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, - U.S. -- , 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989), and
National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989), the Court
concluded that drug testing implicates the fourth amendment even when conducted for non-law
enforcement purposes by government employers, or by employers subject to governmental
regulations.
30. It is clear that state universities engaged in drug testing are involved in state action within
the scope of the fourth amendment. A related issue, not within the scope of this article, is whether
the NCAA, as a result of its extensive "legislation" and regulations, or its relationship with state
institutions, is limited by the fourth amendment in its ability to randomly drug test. While this
article does not resolve this issue, it should be noted that the NCAA was determined not to be a
state actor for fourteenth amendment purposes in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Tarkanian, 484 U.S. 1058 (1988). In Tarkanian, the Court found that no state action existed as to
the NCAA, even though a state university carried out its disciplinary policy against the plaintiff.
It should be noted, however, that Tarkanian does not suggest that the state university is in any
way shielded from state action scrutiny by virtue of its performance as the implementing agent of
NCAA policy. Drug testing performed by a state university is state action regardless of whether it
is done as a matter of university policy or at the behest of the NCAA.
31. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
32. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
33. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413.
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visual and aural monitoring of urine sample collection.34 Quoting from the
Fifth Circuit, the Court noted:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than
the passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they
talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without
observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally prohibited
by law as well as social custom.35
The Court's conclusion in Skinner and Von Raab that urinalysis con-
ducted pursuant to state action is a search, is consistent with court prece-
dent. In Schmerber v. California,36 the petitioner, a driver of a vehicle
involved in an accident, was hospitalized following the accident. A police
officer, acting on information suggesting that the driver was intoxicated,
placed the petitioner under arrest and instructed a physician to draw a
blood sample for testing. Although the tests were objected to by the driver,
the results were used to obtain a drunk driving conviction.
On appeal, the petitioner asserted that the taking of a blood sample was
a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and
therefore must be reasonable. The Court agreed with the petitioner's asser-
tion and stated:
[C]ompulsory administration of a blood test... plainly involves the
broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. That Amendment expressly provides that "[tihe right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated . . . ." It could not reasonably be argued, and indeed
respondent does not argue, that the administration of the blood test
in this case was free of the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. 7
Since Schmerber, many courts have applied the holding to a wide range
of state generated bodily intrusions,38 including the taking of urine sam-
34. Id.
35. Id., quoting National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th
Cir. 1987).
36. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
37. Id. at 767 (emphasis added). The Court, after concluding that the extraction of a blood
sample was a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment, went on to hold that such
searches are not automatically proscribed. "ITihe Fourth Amendment's proper function is to con-
strain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which ... are made in an improper
manner." Id. at 768. Noting that the officer plainly had probable cause sufficient for fourth
amendment purposes, the Court found this search activity to be reasonable.
38. In United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the court recognized that
the taking of an x-ray involved bodily intrusion sufficient to trigger the fourth amendment. In
Cole v. Parr, 595 P.2d 1349 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979), the court recognized the fourth amendment
1990]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
pies.3 9 In particular, the latter courts have applied the Schmerber reasoning
even though urine testing, unlike blood testing, normally does not involve
an invasion of the body.
It is conceivable that in light of the distinction between blood and urine
testing, the Court in Skinner and in Von Raab might have opted to consider
urine testing as unintrusive and of no particular privacy interest. This no-
tion might find some support in the well-established fourth amendment the-
ory of abandonment;' however, such an approach ignores the conditions
under which urine samples are produced and the private nature of this bod-
ily function. In McDonell v. Hunter,4 the court recognized that urinalysis
involved fourth amendment protected expectations of privacy and stated:
Urine, unlike blood, is routinely discharged from the body, so no
governmental intrusion into the body is required to seize urine.
However, urine is discharged and disposed of under circumstances
where the person certainly has a reasonable and legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy. One does not reasonably expect to discharge urine
under circumstances making it available to others to collect and ana-
lyze in order to discover the personal physiological secrets it holds,
except as part of a medical examination. It is significant that both
blood and urine can be analyzed in a medical laboratory to discover
numerous physiological facts about the person from whom it came,
including but hardly limited to recent ingestion of alcohol or drugs.
One clearly has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in
application to the taking of hair, saliva or seminal fluid samples. See generally Comment, Analyz-
ing the Reasonableness of Bodily Intrusions, 68 MARQ. L. REv. 130 (1984).
39. MeDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136
(3d Cir. 1986); Division 241 Amalgated Transit v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976); Commit-
tee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.
Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985); People v. Williams, 192 Colo. 249, 557 P.2d 399 (1976); Davis v.
District of Columbia, 247 A.2d 417 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Caruso v. Ward, 72 N.Y.2d 432, 530
N.E.2d 850, 534 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1988); Patchogue-Medford Congress v. Board of Educ., 119
A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986); State v. Rangitsch, 40 Wash. App. 771,700 P.2d 382 (1985).
40. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924). Agents found items dropped or
thrown in a field by the defendants. The Court stated: "The defendant's own acts, and those of
his associates, disclosed the jug, the jar and the bottle - and there was no seizure in the sense of
the law when the officers examined the contents of each after it had been abandoned." Id.
But see W. LAFAvE, supra note 23, § 2.6(b), at 469:
It should not be assumed, however, that in every instance in which a defendant relin-
quishes possession or control, albeit briefly, an abandonment for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses has occurred. The fundamental question is whether the relinquishment occurred
under circumstances which indicate he retained no justified expectation of privacy in the
object.
Id. at 469; see also Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) (passenger who drops a package in a
taxicab has not necessarily abandoned the item).
41. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (D.C. Iowa 1985) (citations omitted).
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such personal information contained in his body fluids. Therefore
governmental taking of a urine specimen is a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 2
IV. WARRANTS, PROBABLE CAUSE, AND REASONABLENESS
Application of the fourth amendment demands consideration of the
traditional warrant and probable cause requirements to random drug test-
ing of student athletes. The warrant and probable cause requirements are
threshold issues to the fourth amendment command that searches be rea-
sonable. The fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness stems from
language declaring "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."43
This "reasonableness" requirement manifests itself along two distinct lines.
First, "whether the [search] was justified at its inception,"'  and second,
"whether the search as actually conducted" was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. ' '4s
The existence of a properly issued warrant, or probable cause alone
where an exception to the warrant requirement is recognized, has tradition-
ally been sufficient for justification of the search at its inception." The war-
rant suffices because, if properly issued, it is based on probable cause
determined by a neutral magistrate.4 7 It is an often quoted principle that
"except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search... without
proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant. '48
The initial question regarding the warrant requirement, is whether the
drug testing of student athletes should fall within that category of exigent
circumstances, justifying warrantless searches. In Von Raab and Skinner,
the Court concluded that the purposes of the warrant requirement are met
by the stringent and well delineated circumstances set forth by the regula-
tions establishing the testing procedure. Further, the Court in Skinner
found that "the Government's interest in dispensing with the warrant re-
42. Id. at 1127.
43. U.S. CONsr. amend IV.
44. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
45. Id.
46. As the court stated in Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986):
"What is reasonable depends upon the context in which a search takes place. Ordinarily a search
requires both a warrant and probable cause to qualify as constitutionally reasonable." Id. at 1513.
See generally W. LAFAVE, supra note 23, § 3.1(a), at 541-43.
47. See W. LAFAvE, supra note 23, § 3.1(a), at 541-43.
48. Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364, 370 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967)).
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quirement is at its strongest when.., the burden of obtaining a warrant is
likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search."4 9 Given
the relatively constant rate at which drugs are eliminated from the blood-
stream, the imposition of a warrant requirement in the case of mandatory
urinalysis would defeat the purpose of administering a test otherwise
justified.
The question of probable cause, or a suspicion-based substitute, has
proven more controversial when applied to drug testing. TL.O. suggested
that the traditional "probable cause" requirement is not sacroscant, but
may be modified by legitimate governmental interest." This language has
been used by several courts as support for total abandonment of any re-
quirement of suspicion to justify random drug testing."1 This position,
however, represents a serious misreading of the Supreme Court's language.
Although T.L. 0. notes that in some instances a requirement of a suspicion
base may be discarded, in no case has the court ever abandoned suspicion in
the face of substantial expectations of privacy.52 Courts are wrong in as-
suming that in the balance between legitimate state interest and significant
expectations of privacy, the former may completely swallow the latter.
In Von Raab, the Court faced a testing scheme in which only certain
custom agents seeking promotion were subjected to testing. The testing did
not involve an arbitrary sampling over unspecified periods of time, but
49. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1419 (1989)
(citations omitted).
50. Ordinarily, a search - even one that may permissibly be carried out without a war-
rant - must be based upon "probable cause" to believe that a violation of the law has
occurred. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-66 (1968). However, "probable cause" is not an irreducible
requirement of a valid search. The fundamental requirement of the fourth amendment is
that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although both the concept of probable cause
and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of the search... in certain
limited circumstances neither is required.
T.LO., 469 U.S. at 340-41 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
51. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit
Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976); Poole v. Stephens, 688 F. Supp. 149 (D. N.J.
1988).
52. In the "closely regulated industry" cases mentioned earlier, the Court indicates in each
that because of the nature of the commercial industry, the proprietor in essence had no expecta-
tion of privacy regarding inspections of the property. The long history of inspections and regula-
tions had, in each case, conditioned the owner to expect constant and unannounced entry by the
state. This rationale has never been applied by the Court to searches of the person or for that
matter, searches of non-commercial personal property. What the Court has done is use the state
interest/privacy interest balancing test to reduce - but not eliminate the probable cause require-
ment to reasonable suspicion.
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rather, represented certain testing at known times. 3 Consequently, the
Court stated: "The procedures prescribed by the Customs Service for the
collection and analysis of the requisite samples do not carry the grave po-
tential for arbitrary and oppressive interference with the privacy and per-
sonal security of the individuals."54 In Skinner, the testing occurred only
after certain specified accidents or incidents. Thus, the Court was not faced
with random selection but instead with semi-generalized suspicion.
Further, in neither case was actual observation of urine collection pres-
ent. In Von Raab, the test subject produces a urine sample behind a parti-
tion,5" and in Skinner, the subject was transported to a medical facility
where observation of urine production was not required. 6 The privacy in-
terest is actually stronger in drug testing plans which require persons to be
subject to observation while taking a urine test."
The existence of a strong privacy interest as part of the equation of rea-
sonableness is of little doubt. Of a more speculative nature, however, is the
assertion of a legitimate state interest sufficient to overcome the significant
expectation of privacy, in testing for cocaine and other "recreational
drugs." The case for a legitimate state university interest in mandatory
drug testing is briefly stated in the introduction to the Ohio State policy:5 8
"(1) To serve as a deterrent to drug or alcohol use by the athlete; (2) To
identify athletes who are addicted to substances; (3) To promote education
and arrange treatment for the athlete who needs help; and (4) To protect
the integrity of the Ohio State University." 9
53. As the Court noted in National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, - U.S. -, 109
S. Ct. 1384, 1394 (1989), intrusion at known places and times significantly minimizes the intrusion
on privacy, and thereby makes governmental action more reasonable. See also United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
54. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394 n.2.
55. Id. at 1388.
56. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418.
57. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Case No. 619209, Statement of Intended Deci-
sion (California Superior Court, Santa Clara Cty. 1987); see also Feliciano v. City of Cleveland,
661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
58. See Appendix.
59. The Ohio State University statement of purpose bears remarkable similarity to the state-
ments of purpose for many universities, eg., University of Illinois: "The purposes of drug testing
are as follows: (1) To serve as a deterrent to drug use by the athlete; (2) To identify athletes who
are substance abusers; (3) To promote education and treatment for the athlete." UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAM ADOPTED BY THE A.A. BOARD OF DIRECTORS AT A
SPECIAL MEETING - MAY 23, 1985; Indiana University statement of purpose provides:
To generally educate Indiana University student-athletes concerning the problems of drug
abuse; To educate any student-athlete identified with a problem regarding the use of drugs
as it may affect the athlete and his/her team and teammates; To provide a common mecha-
nism for the detection, sanction and treatment of specific cases of drug abuse; To provide
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The stated purposes have in common their reliance on certain assump-
tions that are seldom documented. These assumptions can be characterized
as: (A) Drug use by student-athletes is rampant; (B) It is disproportionate
when compared with non-athletes; (C) Recreational drug use poses an unu-
sual, serious risk of harm; and (D) Athletes, because of high visibility, cre-
ate a substantial risk of embarrassment to the university. Whether these
assumptions are true, or if true, justify significant invasion of privacy with-
out probable cause (or reasonable suspicion), is a question requiring a closer
look.
A. Drug Use Among Student-Athletes - Epidemic or Hysteria?
The motivation behind an editorial in the Akron Beacon Journal, en-
dorsing a drug testing program by Kent State University,' aptly sums up
public opinion. The editorial board was asked how can student-athletes be
subjected to testing without testing other segments of the university com-
munity. The response was: "Athletes are special. And drugs are a perva-
sive special problem with them. Witness Len Bias."61
The public perception of drugs as a special problem for athletics cam be
traced back to the Olympics and to NCAA concerns over performance en-
hancing drug use in the 1970s.62 Such concerns culminated in congressional
hearings in 1973,63 and the decision of the NCAA to develop a drug testing
program. Drug usage in this category was apparently difficult to measure,
even though estimates ranged as high as 68 percent use by the University of
California's football team.6r
Only in recent years has attention turned to "recreational" drug use. A
1985 study by Michigan State University surveyed and compared drug use
reasonable safeguards to insure that every student-athlete is medically fit to participate in
athletic competition; To prevent any drug use by Indiana University student-athletes; To
identify any student-athlete who may be using drugs and to identify the drug, and; To
encourage the prompt treatment of drug dependency.
INDIANA UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS DRUG SCREENING
PROGRAM AND POLICIES; University of Iowa provides: "Protect individual student-athletes, their
teammates, and the university from irremediable adverse consequences of NCAA-sponsorel drug
testing; Promote education, counseling and treatment for the student-athlete who needs help with
substance abuse." UNIVERSITY OF IOWA DEPARTMENTS OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
DRUG EDUCATION AND TESTING PROGRAM, MAY 13, 1986.
60. Akron Beacon Journal, December 14, 1986, at 8.
61. Cooper, Our Search for an Editorial Position: The Drug Testing Dilemma, Akron Beacon
Journal, December 14, 1986, at 7.
62. Note, supra note 2.
63. Id. at 205.
64. This statistic was apparently not derived from empirical research, but from testimony
before an NCAA Committee. See id. at 207.
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of athletes and non-athletes. The results showed that marijuana use among
student-athletes ranged from 25 to 35 percent, as opposed to 42 percent
among the general student college population.65 Cocaine use was estimated
to be 17 percent for student-athletes and non-athlete students.66 Such re-
sults counter the public perception that student-athletes use drugs more
often than does the general student body.
The issue of justification for drug testing of student-athletes was raised
judicially, perhaps for the first time, in a challenge by a Stanford University
student-athlete to the NCAA drug testing program.6 7 In enjoining the
NCAA program, the court noted the following:
The most informative evidence on the scope of the problem of drug
use among student athletes is provided by the NCAA's own test re-
sults from the 1986-87 season. Of 3,511 students tested, only 34
were declared ineligible. Of that, 31 were football players. Of those
34 ineligible students 26 were positive for steroids and 7 for
68cocaine.
If, as suggested, student-athletes present no greater threat of drug abuse
than non-athletes, then the only remaining "state interest" that might jus-
tify singling out student-athletes for privacy invasion is their high visibility
as role models and university representatives. There is no question that in
certain sports, student-athletes are viewed as role models. There is some
question, however, of the university's responsibility to protect that image.
More importantly, concerns regarding role models, images, ethics, and mo-
rality, all must be balanced against the individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy.69
B. Particularized Reasonable Suspicion
Assuming that the foregoing discussion may suggest some legitimate
state interest, it is certainly not so strong as to justify the unprecedented
step of total negation of the reasonable suspicion requirement in favor of
random testing. However, courts have had little difficulty in recognizing
that the traditional probable cause standard may be altered, consistent with
the requirements of reasonableness.
65. Anderson & McKeag, Substance Abuse Habits of College Student Athletes, INSTITUTE OF
SOCIAL RESEARCH, Michigan State University (1985).
66. Id.
67. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Case No. 619209, Statement of Intended Deci-
sion (Superior Ct. Calif., Santa Clara Cty., 1987).
68. Id. at 10.
69. As the Court noted in Hill: "Maintaining high ethical standards in the medical profession
has been held not to be such a compelling need that an individual's privacy and right to make
personal medical decisions should be infringed." Id. at 11 (citation omitted).
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The basic message of T.L. ., that "probable cause" is not an irreducible
requirement of a valid search," 7 has been heard by lower courts regarding
drug testing in the workplace.71 These cases recognize that the traditional
probable cause requirement is applicable to criminal cases only.7 2 In the
context of administrative actions, the legitimate state interest and the expec-
tation of privacy are satisfied by use of the less restrictive "reasonable suspi-
cion" standard.73
A question unanswered in T.L.O. is whether the reasonable suspicion
requirement must be particularized as to individuals, or whether class sus-
picion would suffice.7 4 As applied to the student-athlete, past statistical data
might form the basis of reasonable suspicion for whole teams, or perhaps all
student athletes, if the concept of individualized suspicion is rejected. In
Skinner, it appears that the Court concluded suspicion need not be particu-
larized in the traditional sense. The railroad employees subject to
mandatory urinalysis by the Federal Railroad Administration's regulations
70. TL O., 469 U.S. at 340.
71. Amalgamated Transit Union 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D. N.J. 1986); City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1985); Patchogue-Medford Congress v. Board of Educ., 805
N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986).
72. In Patchoque-Medford, the court affirmed the lower court's striking of a requirement that
teachers seeking tenure submit to random urinalysis. In doing so, it pointed out: "We note,
however, that we reject the argument that the type of test proposed in this case is warranted only
upon a showing of a full-scale probable cause. Probable cause is not required where the search is
not aimed at the discovery of evidence for use in a criminal trial." 805 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
73. Although it is less than clear that a reduction in the probable cause requirement is justi-
fied, in Camara the Court based its reduction in the probable cause standard in large part on the
fact that the search was non-personal in nature and was a limited invasion of privacy. 387 U.S. at
537. Observed urination, as discussed above, is a very personal intrusion and a significant inva-
sion of privacy.
In T.L 0., the Court held that rather than requiring "probable cause to believe that the subject
of the search has violated the law" it is sufficient regarding what was a non-personal search, that
"reasonable grounds [exist] for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student
has violated.. the rules of the school." 469 U.S. at 342.
Previously, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court defined reasonable suspicion as
"specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant [an] intrusion." 392 U.S. at 21. Further, the facts forming the basis of reason-
able suspicion must (a) be judged against an objective standard, (b) be available to the searcher at
the moment of search, and, (c) "[w]arrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the
action taken was appropriate. Id. at 21-22.
74. "We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reason-
ableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities." T.LO., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8.
However, the Court goes on to say in the same note: "Exceptions to the requirement of individu-
alized suspicion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search
are minimal and where "other safeguards" are available "to assure that the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the field.'" Id. (citation
omitted).
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were only those "who are involved in certain train accidents."75 The FDA
promulgated regulations after a review of accident investigation reports and
found that "from 1972 to 1983 the nation's railroads experienced at least 21
significant train accidents involving alcohol or drug use as a probable cause
or a contributing factor."76
The nexus between drug-alcohol use and accidents provided a basis to
attempt to control substance abuse. However, of significance to the Court in
resolving the question of fourth amendment mandated reasonable suspi-
cion, is the regulation requirement that testing occur only as an aftermath
to an actual accident. It is therefore difficult to conclude that the require-
ment of particularized reasonable suspicion is totally abandoned because of
the strong governmental interest in testing. The issue of whether such sus-
picion is a necessary element of a state university-sponsored random drug
testing program for student-athletes must be resolved in light of the unsub-
stantiated level of drug use among a class of individuals who are not in-
volved in a sensitive or high public danger environment.
The general, and proper, approach taken by most courts considering the
issue has been to require particularized suspicion." Critics of particular-
ized suspicion claim that university athletic staffs, as a practical matter, are
incapable of effectively spotting indicia of drug use sufficient to give rise to
suspicion. Additionally, there is some concern that the relationship be-
tween student-athletes, on the one hand, and training staff, coaches and
administrators on the other, would be materially damaged by the university
playing the roles of watchdog, investigator and accuser.
In any event, the concern that university personnel are unable to suspect
drug use, is a matter of training. In 1971, the Drug Education Committee
of the NCAA produced the booklet, The Coach: Drugs, Ergogenic Aids and
the Athlete.7" The publication indicates that although the problem of recog-
nizing drug use is complicated, "[t]he person who begins to show personal-
75. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1407. As the Court noted:
[Upon the occurrence of certain specified events Toxicological testing is required follow-
ing a "major train accident," which is defined as any train accident that involves (i) a
fatality, (ii) the release of hazardous material accompanied by an evacuation or a reporta-
ble injury, or (iii) damage to railroad property of $500,000.
Id.
76. Id. at 1407.
77. See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
78. National Collegiate Athletic Association (1971). This document was presented before
Congress as part of the house inquiry in drug use among college athletes. See supra note 2. Ironi-
cally, the Ohio State head trainer, Alan Hart was a member of that committee, along with Robert
W. Pritchard, Worchester Polytechnic Institute, Donald L. Cooper, M.D., Oklahoma State Uni-
versity, and Harden Jones, Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley.
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ity changes or who withdraws from his usual activities may be suspect. It
has been shown that drug abusers frequently will miss classes. They will
begin to do work in the classroom that is below their previous performance
levels."' 9 The booklet goes on to list 15 factors which may indicate drug
use in the student athlete.80
Aside from the protection of the substantial privacy interest involved,
individualized reasonable suspicion serves a function particularly significant
in the search for student-athletes involved with "recreational drugs." The
disproportionately high percentage of student-athletes receiving widespread
media and public attention for alleged marijuana and/or cocaine use are
Black. Such attention fosters beliefs that Blacks are more prone to drug use
of this nature. These conclusions are made despite a lack of reliable statisti-
cal and/or sociological data to support such conclusions based on race. Ra-
cism is certainly not unknown in our educational and legal systems.
Unfettered discretion in the hands of predominantly White university offi-
79. Drug Education Committee of the NCAA, The Coach. Drugs, Ergogenic Aids and the
Athlete, at 4 (1971).
80.
1. Inability to coordinate, stand or walk.
2. Muddled speech.
3. Impaired judgment (barbituate user).
4. Rapid pulse.
5. Restlessness.
6. Jittery.
7. Muscular twitches.
8. Heavy sweating and bad breath (hallmarks of amphetamine abuse).
9. Nervous, highly talkative, over-active, possibly hostile, aggressive and paranoid behavior
(amphetamine).
10. Marijuana abuse:
Acute effects -
... red eyes are fairly common symptoms.
... may begin to miss gym class and then other classes.
... increased appetite with special craving for sweets.
Persisting effects -
... clumsiness.
... lowered attention span.
... regular user is apathetic, listless and careless about his personal habits.
... may lead to lack of motivation and loss of long-term goals.
... may have recognizable odor on their person.
11. Pinpoint pupils - could be heroin or another narcotic abuse.
12. Chills.
13. Needlemarks on arms and legs. Addicts often wear long-sleeved sweaters, even in
summer to both keep warm and hide scars.
14. A person's language (his jargon) may indicate he uses drugs.
15. Episodes of stupor and incoherent speech may indicate possible acute LSD intoxication.
Id. at 5.
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cials creates ripe opportunities for racial oppression.81 Subjecting Black
Americans to significant invasions of privacy without an articulable, objec-
tive, reasonable basis was one of the prime concerns motivating the appel-
lants in Terry v. Ohio.8 2 While certainly not enough to control improper
invasions of privacy based on impermissible racial grounds, particularized
suspicion is a significant protection.
C. The Administrative Search Exception
Exceptions to the probable cause requirement have been recognized in
several areas. Of particular significance are so-called "administrative
searches."" 3 Not all searches covered by the fourth amendment engender
the same protection. Searches that serve "special governmental needs" '
and are part of an administrative scheme may trigger reduced scrutiny
under the fourth amendment. To understand the impact of fourth amend-
ment considerations on the drug testing of athletes, it is necessary to deter-
mine if and how such activities fit within the context of administrative
searches.
The notion that an administrative search is immune from fourth amend-
ment restrictions has been firmly rejected by the Supreme Court.85 The real
question is not whether the fourth amendment is applicable, but rather to
what extent do the strictures of probable cause and reasonableness apply to
such activities.
81. For example, the public interest in college athletics centers on football and basketball,
sports where, on many university teams, Blacks are disproportionately represented. Drug testing
results, in all probability, will be more closely scrutinized in these areas.
82. 392 U.S. 1. Terry involved Black individuals who were stopped after being observed "act-
ing suspicious." The Court noted: "The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of Justice found that "[i]n many communities, field interrogation are a major source
of friction between the police and minority groups. President's Commission of Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police 183 (1967)." Id. at 14 n. 11.
Similarly in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1982), Edward Lawson was stopped and sub-
sequently arrested 15 times, solely because he was a Black man with long hair walking in white
neighborhoods. The Court invalidated the subsequent arrest noting that serious questions about
whether particularized reasonable suspicion existed to allow such conduct under Terry. Id. at
363-65 (Brennan, J., concurring).
83. "Administrative" or "regulatory" searches refers to those non-criminal evidence seeking
search activities carried out by administrative agencies in furtherance of a legislative or adminis-
trative plan. For a full discussion of the history of administrative searches see Note, The "'Admin-
istrative" Search From Dewey to Burger: Dismantling the Fourth Amendment, 16 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 261 (1989).
84. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414-15.
85. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
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The Supreme Court's approach to administrative searches has its origin
in the 1967 cases of Camara v. Municipal Court86 and See v. City of Seat-
tle.7 The Court recognized in both decisions that the fourth amendment
was applicable in protecting individual rights and that privacy rights must
be protected in a civil context as well as in criminal proceedings. In
Camara and See, the Court found that even in a civil context, as a general
rule, a warrant is required for administrative searches. Since Camara and
See, however, the definition of what constitutes an exception to the general
rule has been unclear and subject to debate.88
Regarding probable cause, the Court recognized that administrative
searches could be based on less than traditional probable cause, i.e., reason-
able suspicion. In Camara, the Court noted that in determining if reason-
able suspicion is appropriate, it must consider the history of judicial and
public acceptance of the search, the public interest to be served by the
86. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
87. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
88. See Note, supra note 83, at 267.
In Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-05 (1981), the Court held that the warrantless in-
spection, without notice, of stone quarries pursuant to a requirement of the Federal Mine Safety
Act, was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment because, unlike private homes,
administrative searches of commercial property may be justified solely by the governmental inter-
est to be served. The expectation of privacy that an owner of commercial property has differs
significantly from that of a private homeowner. Note however, that even the warrantless search of
commercial property is limited and such searches may not occur under a scheme that "devolves
almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative offiers ... as to when to search
and whom to search. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978).
In United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972), a warrantless search of a locked
storeroom of a pawn shop conducted during business hours, pursuant to authority granted under
the Gun Control Act of 1968, was upheld. The Court stated: "We have little difficulty in con-
cluding that where, as here, regulatory inspections further urgent federal interest, and the pos-
sibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may
proceed without a warrant where specially authorized by statute." Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970), a federal agent,
while a guest on the petitioner's premises, noted a possible violation of the federal excise tax law.
Subsequently, a forcible entry of a locked liquor storeroom, after permission to search had been
refused by the petitioner, was made and evidence seized. Although the Court held that no warrant
was necessary for a search of commercial property, it found that the search in this case was not
authorized, nor envisioned by Congress in enacting the liquor control provisions of 26 U.S.C.
§ 5146(b). Id. at 73-75.
It is interesting to note that the search in Colonnade was disallowed even though the federal
officer apparently had probable cause to believe an offense had been committed. It is also interest-
ing to note that in all three cases the Court does not discuss whether, apart from the issue of the
necessity of a warrant, searches are required to be based upon probable cause (or as discussed
later, some substitute) in order to meet the reasonableness requirement. The silence on this issue
is only explained by the Court's emphasis on the lower expectation of privacy associated with the
search of commercial property as a normal aspect of business regulation.
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search, and the absence of any other method of achieving the appropriate
administrative goal. 9
One area in which the Court has recognized both an exception to the
warrant requirement and has accepted a reduction of the probable cause
requirement, is that of "closely regulated industries."'9 A closely regulated
industry is identified as one where the "industry [has] such a history of
government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy could
exist." 91
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, the Court applied
the doctrine of closely regulated industry to the question of urinalysis.
Although the Court accepted the application of the fourth amendment to
urinalysis authorized by federal regulation, it viewed the closely regulated
nature of the railroad industry as a significant factor in reducing the expec-
tation of privacy ordinarily associated with urination. The Court stated:
"More importantly, the expectations of privacy of covered employees are
diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated
pervasively to insure safety." 92 The Supreme Court emphasized that unlike
other administrative schemes the employees themselves were the object of
regulation as opposed to their field of endeavor.93
The Supreme Court's reliance on the "closely regulated industry" ap-
proach in Skinner, in essence adopts the Third Circuit's position in Shoe-
maker v. Handel94 regarding the drug testing of race track jockeys. In
Shoemaker, the Third Circuit framed the issue in terms of whether the ad-
89. 387 U.S. at 537.
90. The "closely regulated industry" exception to the general warrant requirement has its
origins in a series of Supreme Court cases, beginning with Colonnade and continuing in Barlow's,
where the Court stated: "Certain industries have such a history of government oversight [sic] that
no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist ... ." 436 U.S. at 313; see also Donovan, 452 U.S.
at 599-601; Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315-16. The theory was more clearly explained by the court in
Ballo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984):
In determining whether warrantless searches in a closely regulated industry are reasonable
we must decide whether the regulatory scheme in terms of the certainty and regularity of
its application, provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.
Id. at 765-66 (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603).
91. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313.
92. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1418 (1989).
93. We do not suggest, of course, that the interest in bodily security enjoyed by those
employed in a regulated industry must always be considered minimal. Here however, the
covered employees have long been a principal focus of regulatory concern.
Id, at 1418.
94. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
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mittedly applicable fourth amendment 95 reasonableness requirement was
satisfied by adherence only to a warrant requirement. Several well known
jockeys challenged the New Jersey Racing Commission's requirement that
inter alia all jockeys submit to daily breathalyzer tests and random urinal-
ysis. The Court noted that the general requirement of a warrant has been
subject to exceptions, particularly in the area of administrative inspections,
and went on to hold that, (1) a strong state interest in conducting unan-
nounced searches combined with, (2) the heavily regulated nature of horse
racing, reduced the justifiable privacy interest of the subjects of the admit-
ted search. It is interesting that the court on this point viewed the question
of the jockey's personal privacy of no greater interest than the historical
privacy of the horse he or she rides.
The application of the Shoemaker approach to student athletes at state
universities would require the recognition of college athletics as a "closely
regulated industry." In this regard, there is little question that intercollegi-
ate athletics is heavily regulated at the national level; however, this regula-
tion is largely self-imposed by way of membership in various amateur
athletic associations.96 The most notable of these organizations is the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The NCAA is comprised
of over 800 four-year colleges and universities voluntarily associated and
regulated by rules, by-laws and regulations to which each member institu-
tion agrees to adhere.97 The regulations are enforced through a shi step
administrative process consisting of: (1) a preliminary inquiry, (2) an offi-
cial inquiry, (3) a hearing before the Committee on Infractions, (4) a report
of findings, (5) an assignment of penalties, and (6) a right to appeal."
95. The defendant New Jersey Racing Commission, recognized the applicability of Camara
and See and conceded that the fourth amendment applied to state administrative agency searches.
Id at 1141.
96. As pointed out by Professors Robert C. Berry and Glenn M. Wong: "Amateur athletic
associations are a pervasive part of American society. Individuals in the United States begin
participating in such organizations at an early age (Pop Warner Football, Biddy Basketball, etc.)
and continue to do so through adulthood." 2 R. BERRY & G. WONG, LAW AND BusImiESS OF
THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES 3 (1986).
97. Id at 15.
98. The NCAA constitution provides:
Section 1. Purposes. The purposes of the association are:
(a) To initiate, stimulate and improve intercollegiate athletic programs for student-ath-
letes and to promote and develop educational leadership, physical fitness, sports participa-
tion as a recreational pursuit and athletic excellence;
(b) To uphold the principle of institutional control of, and responsibility for, all intercol-
legiate sports in conformity with the constitution and bylaws of this Association;
(c) To encourage its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply with satisfactory stan-
dards of scholarship, sportsmanship and amateurism;
[Vol. 1:41
RANDOM DRUG TESTING
Although this highly structured administrative scheme gives a great
deal of support to the notion that intercollegiate athletics is a "heavily regu-
lated industry," the NCAA constitution and regulations make clear that
individual institutions control the governance of athletic programs within
its respective institution. NCAA regulations are designed to control inter-
collegiate competition and do not restrict the ability of member institutions
to set their own standards for governance and control. Indeed, the NCAA
drug testing policy99 applies only to intercollegiate competition, and does
not restrict a member institution from developing its own policy. In addi-
tion to membership in the NCAA, most institutions are also associated with
regional conferences. These conferences in turn have developed rules and
regulations for the governance of conference members.
The freedom of member institutions to adopt their own policies regard-
ing eligibility, academic progress and non-intercollegiate student-athlete
conduct distinguishes them from the type of heavy regulations on the day to
day activities of the jockeys in Shoemaker or the railroad workers in Skin-
ner. Even if the argument that collegiate athletics is a "closely regulated
industry," has some merit, difficulty exists in applying the Shoemaker
fourth amendment rationale. While there may be "an obvious analogy be-
tween state regulation of professional jockeys as athletes and public college
or university regulation of student athletes,"' l" ° the two-pronged approach
employed by the Shoemaker Court must be satisfied.
In Shoemaker the Third Circuit noted:
There are two interrelated requirements justifying the warrantless
administrative search exception. First there must be a strong state
interest in conducting an unannounced search. Second, the pervasive
(d) To formulate, copyright and publish rules of play governing intercollegiate sports;
(e) To preserve intercollegiate athletic records;
(f) To supervise the conduct of, and to establish eligibility standards for, regional and
national athletic events under the auspices of this Association;
(g) To cooperate with other amateur athletic organizations in promoting and conducting
national and international athletic events;
(h) To legislate, through bylaws or by resolution of a Convention, upon any subject of
general concern to the members in the administration of intercollegiate athletics; and
(i) To study in general all phases of competitive intercollegiate athletics and establish
standards whereby the colleges and universities of the United States can maintain their
athletic activities on a high level.
1985-86 NCAA MANUAL, Constitution 2-1.
99. Although the NCAA drug testing program is beyond the scope of this article, it should be
noted that at least one court has found that not only do student athletes retain their expectation of
privacy, but also that requiring such testing without individualized probable cause is impermissi-
ble under the fourth amendment. See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Case No.
619209, Statement of Intended Decision (Superior Ct. Calif., Santa Clara Cty, 1987).
100. Spicer, Drug Testing, Student Athletes, and the Constitution, 13 VA. BAR A. J. 11 (1987).
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regulation of the industry must have reduced the justifiable privacy
expectation of the subject of the search. 10 1
In Von Raab and Skinner, neither of which involved random testing, 2 the
Court viewed the governmental interest as one of concern for public safety
in critical situations. 103 Other courts which have found an overriding state
interest sufficient to shift the balance of reasonableness in favor of the state,
have limited such applications to instances of public safety or significant
issues of public trust."° While many of us "take our sports seriously" it
would be inimical to the entire concept of amateur athletics to conceive of
the student-athlete as critical to the health, safety or even the public trust of
society.
Without the "critical position" rationale, a regulatory search justifica-
tion under Skinner must depend upon the second interrelated prong: the
lower expectation of privacy flowing from a history of extensive regula-
101. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142 (citations omitted).
102. As noted earlier, the treasury agents in Von Raab knew they were to be treated in order
to be considered for promotion. In Skinner, the railway employees knew that the occurrence of an
accident would trigger the possibility of drug testing. In both cases the expectation of privacy was
reduced by the triggering circumstance. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1384.
103. In Von Raab, the governmental interest was characterized as ensuring the fitness of "our
Nation's first line of defense against one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare
of our population." Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392. The ability to detect drug use among customs
agents was, in the view of the Court, necessary to protect the ability of agents to "discharge their
duties honestly and vigorously" and to protect "the safety of their fellow agents." Id. at 1389.
In Skinner, the court stated:
By contrast, the government interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspi-
cion is compelling. Employees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught with risks of
injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous conse-
quences. Much like persons who have routine access to dangerous nuclear power facilities.
109 S. Ct. at 1419.
104. In Poole v. Stephens, 688 F. Supp. 149 (D.N.J. 1988), the district court reviewed the
cases upholding random, mandatory drug testing as part of state regulation of a "closely regulated
industry." In rejecting a corrections officers' union challenge of a New Jersey plan to randomly
test all correction officer recruits, the court noted: "Throughout these cases runs a common
thread that the particular job to be performed by the employee is the critical factor that tips the
balance of rights in favor of the reasonableness of a random (or similar) urinalysis testing pro-
gram." Id. at 155.
The court went on to find that correction officers were similarly situated with school bus
drivers, customs agents, train operators and nuclear power plant operators in occupying critical
safety and health positions or, in the case of the Shoemaker, horse racing jockeys' positions requir-
ing special public confidence.
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tion.' The university regulation must "have such a history of government
oversight [sic] that no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist .... ,."
In New York v. Burger,10' the United States Supreme Court again recog-
nized that those who operate commercial premises in a "closely regulated
industry" may have a reduced expectation of privacy sufficient to overcome
the traditional requirement of a warrant and probable cause.' 08 However,
such a departure from the traditional reasonableness requirement will be
constitutional only if three criteria are met: First, there must be a substan-
tial governmental interest at stake," 9 second, "the warrantless inspections
must be "necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme,"1 0 and third, the
established regulatory procedure for inspection "must perform the two ba-
sic functions of a warrant; it must advise the owner of the commercial
premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a prop-
erly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting
officers."111
More importantly however, the expectation of privacy and protection
regarding day to day student life, from random unannounced drug testing,
distinguishes university created mandatory testing from the type of admin-
istrative searches tacitly approved in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc..' 2 Despite
the existence of the regulation of student life as part of higher education,
courts have traditionally recognized that individual student privacy is a
cherished and protected right. In Morale v. Grigel" 3 the court held that a
student has a privacy interest that is invaded where the university searches
a dormitory room without probable cause. Similarly in Smyth v. Lubbers ' 4
the student's right to privacy was invaded where the university staged a
midnight dormitory raid.
105. In fact the example typically given of lower expectations of privacy in this context more
often than not describes situations of no expectation of privacy. It is the nature of closely regu-
lated businesses that constant scrutiny is the order of the day. This factor may well explain the
Court's willingness to completely do away with particularized suspicion in commercial searches of
this nature. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
106. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
107. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
108. Id. at 702.
109. Id. at 703; see also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981).
110. Burger, 482 U.S. at 704.
111. Id.
112. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
113. 422 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976).
114. 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
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D. Reasonable Scope of Intrusion
The second prong of the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement
is that the "search is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the search in the first place." ' The purpose in drug testing stu-
dent athletes, as indicated above, involves identifying drug users, and deter-
ring drug use. While such a purpose may be insufficient alone under the
fourth amendment, when preceded by reasonable, individualized suspicion,
such searches have been deemed reasonable in scope.
Not all searches based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion, how-
ever, are deemed reasonable." 6 The scope of the search and the method
employed will offend the fourth amendment if unreasonable. For example,
the obtaining of evidence from the human body, even in the face of valid
suspicion, must be reasonable.' 17 Notwithstanding the existence of prob-
able cause, a search for evidence of a crime may be unjustifiable if it endan-
gers the life or health of the suspect. Another factor is the extent of
intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and
bodily integrity.' 8 In Winston v. Lee," 9 the Court concluded that surgery
requiring general anesthesia, solely for the purpose of conducting a search
was unreasonable.120 But intrusions less physically drastic have not been
found unreasonable. 2'
The issues raised by random drug testing of student-athletes in terms of
fourth amendment protection are not resolved by Von Raab and Skinner.
Von Raab gives us little guidance because it does not address the problem of
significant expectations of privacy. The treasury agents facing a one time
drug test for promotion purposes know and anticipate the state intrusion.
In this respect they are like the welfare recipient in Wyman v. James.22
The parallel in athletics might be the athlete facing an announced or regu-
115. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 588 (9th Cir.), rev'd sub
noa., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
116. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), where the Court found that the use of
deadly force to "seize" an unarmed suspect was unreasonable even though clear probable cause
for arrest existed; see also Jones v. Latexo School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980), where
the court raised questions of whether the use of german shepard dogs to sniff search school chil-
dren was reasonable.
117. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (considered reasonablenss of invading the body
by surgery to obtain evidence).
118. Id. at 761.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 766.
121. See, e.g., United States v. deHernandez, 473 U.S. 537 (1985) (observation of the defend-
ant passing her bowels was not unreasonable where reasonable suspicion existed); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
122. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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larly scheduled physical at which urinalysis is performed. Skinner also
lacks the aspect of randomness associated with the Ohio State plan. The
Ohio State plan does not depend on a triggering event that will alert the
athlete to the distinct possibility that he or she will, in the immediate future,
be drug tested. Neither does either case resolve the issue presented by the
Ohio State plan of consent. Can consent sufficient to avoid fourth amend-
ment concerns be obtained from the student-athlete?
V. CONSENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO FOURTH AMENDMENT
RESTRICTIONS
The Ohio State drug testing program is similar to practically all state
university programs in that it requires that the student-athlete execute a
signed consent to random drug testing. 23 Whether such a signed consent is
sufficient to avoid application of fourth amendment protections is readily
gleaned from the simple recognition of the characteristics of the persons
being required to waive their constitutional protection. Can a student who
is typically a high school student, 18 years old or younger, most likely (at
least in the major sports - football and basketball) Black, poor and thus
traditionally excluded from higher education, voluntarily relinquish his or
her constitutional rights? Additionally, are such waivers valid where the
alternative is to be denied a scholarship and thus effectively denied an op-
portunity for college? 24
In order to avoid application of the fourth amendment, consent must be
voluntary.' 25 Voluntariness has defied precise definition,' 26 and must be de-
termined by considering the totality of the circumstances on a case by case
basis." 7 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,2 s indicated some of the "circum-
stances" to be considered; age, education level, intelligence, and lack of ad-
vice concerning constitutional rights. To this list other courts have added
the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions"' 29 which prohibit forcing the
123. See Appendix.
124. Although theoretically a potential student might attend another institution if she/he
does not wish to attend a school with mandatory drug testing, practically speaking, such an alter-
native is non-existent. Aside from the impact on and damage to the reputation from "refusing"
drug testing, the timing of most requests for signed consents makes impossible the choice of an
alternative school, without at least the loss of valuable eligibility.
125. Schnecldoth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
126. "Cases yield no talismanic definition of 'voluntariness,' mechanically applicable to the
host of situations where the question has arisen." Id. at 224.
127. Id. at 227.
128. Id at 218.
129. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has its roots in the 1925 decision of Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railway Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1925):
1990]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
relinquishment of fourth amendment rights in order to receive government
benefits. 3 ' Looking at these various factors raises serious questions as to
whether execution of the Ohio State type of consent form constitutes a vol-
untary consent for fourth amendment purposes:
AGE - Because the beginning student-athlete is required to sign this
form prior to attending college he or she will typically still be in their
teen years and often under the age of majority (18). Minors are not
automatically incapable or incompetent to give consent. 131 However,
the youth and the relatively unsophisticated nature of the individual is a
significant factor.
EDUCATION - It is the height of irony that a university would require
high school students (many of them from "poor" schools with limited
resources) to consent to the relinquishment of their constitutional
rights, while at the same time proclaiming a need to "improve" the aca-
demic quality of the same student via the recently enacted proposition
48,132 which has as its central tenet, the poor educational preparation of
the student-athlete. Even the best educated high school student is at
best - only a high school student.
LACK OF INFORMATION REGARDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS - Ohio
State, like most universities engaged in drug testing, either denies that
the student has a constitutional right to withhold consent, or does not
inform the student of any realistic option. 133 Regarding the Black teen-
It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state having
power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to
impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limita-
tions is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitu-
tional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a
condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable
that the guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipu-
lated out of existence.
Id.
130. Courts have recognized that even the threatened loss of a privilege (such as athletic
scholarship/participation) may constitute an unconstitutional condition. See Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
For a full discussion of the doctrine's application to collegiate athletics, see Scanlon, Playing
the Drug Testing Game: College Athletes, Regulatory Institutions, and the Structure of Constitu-
tional Argument, 62 IND. L.J. 863, 930-42 (1987).
131. See Fare v. Michael C., 422 U.S. 707 (1979).
132. In 1983, the NCAA enacted bylaw changes, which were commonly referred to as Propo-
sition 48. The core of the bylaw provision conditioned eligibility upon the achievement of certain
scores on the standardized college entrance exams, and the achievement of a grade point average
of 2.0 or better in certain "core" courses. For a discussion of the racial implications, see Greene,
The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or Racism?, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 101
(1984).
133. Indeed, given the consequences of refusal, there is no realistic option but to sign.
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ager who is often inexperienced with legal doctrine and isolated in a
predominantly white environment, is not far removed from the young
men confronted with similar constitutional choices in Scottsboro, Ala-
bama in 1932.134 No student is provided anything close to information
that suggests that any right to resist drug testing exists.
The doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," i.e. that the waiver of a
constitutional protection can not be demanded in exchange for a govern-
ment benefit, has already been applied to drug testing in the workplace.
The result has been almost unanimous in finding consent involuntary.135
In Piazzolo v. Watkins,1 36 the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that ad-
mission into a dormitory could be conditioned on consent to forego fourth
amendment protection. University officials attempted to justify the search
of student rooms under a regulation which provided: "The College reserves
the right to enter rooms for inspection purposes . ..."I" The Court re-
jected the claim of consent pursuant to this regulation and indicated: "The
regulation cannot be construed or applied so as to give consent to a search
for evidence . . .. [O]therwise, the regulation itself would constitute an
unconstitutional attempt to require a student to waive his protection from
unreasonable searches as a condition to his occupancy of a college dormi-
tory room." 1 31 If the ultimate test of voluntariness is whether the student
consent is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice," 1 39
it is difficult to imagine a teenager faced with the choice of scholarship and
education or nothing, as acting in a manner sufficient to satisfy the demands
of fourth amendment consent.
The fourth amendment problems posed by mandatory, random drug
testing are serious, and quite likely insurmountable. These problems are
not resolved by consideration of cases allowing drug testing in the work-
place because the rationale for workplace drug testing is considerably differ-
ent and potentially stronger than the testing of amateur, student-athletes
not engaged in critical or dangerous positions. Von Raab and Skinner are
not dispositive of such issues.
134. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), which involved the famous "Scottsboro
Boys," nine teenage Black men accused of rape who were faced with a hostile environment and
forced to trial under conditions that forced "waiver" of practically all basic constitutional protec-
tion. Their conviction was overturned because of denial of basic due process.
135. See McDonell v. Hunter, 829 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d
284 (5th Cir. 1971).
136. 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971).
137. Id. at 286.
138. Id. at 289; see also Morale v. Grigel, 442 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976).
139. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225 (citation omitted).
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However, the fourth amendment problem is but one of the significant
legal issues raised by forced urinalysis of student-athletes at state universi-
ties. Issues of due process raise equally serious concerns.
VI. PART II - DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
The Ohio State program, like most university programs, permits the im-
position of sanctions for "positive" test results without the benefit of any
prior hearing. The sanctions are significant for a young athlete; and can
include: suspension, possible loss of scholarship and removal from the
team.
The less serious sanctions are, in actuality, significantly onerous. While
not formally listed as such, the opprobrium which arises from the identifica-
tion of the student as a drug user is as much a sanction and a deterrent as
the loss of any of the other privileges attendant to being a student-athlete.
The typical testing program requires that positive results be revealed to the
coaching staff, the trainer, and the athletic director. It does not take a great
deal of imagination to foresee that a student's positive drug test will be
discovered, at least by the student's fellow team members. In addition, it is
likely that a suspension would be reported by the press when athletes from
major schools are involved.
Given this certain impact on reputation, coupled with the potential loss
of a scholarship (and thus perhaps the ability to attend college and ulti-
mately seek a professional sports career) are such interests protected by due
process? Wisconsin v. Constantineau t1 would certainly suggest that the
protected concept of liberty"'1 is infringed by state action which "attaches a
140. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). In Constantineau, the police, pursuant to statutory authorization,
posted notices identifying the respondent as a person to whom sales of alcohol were forbidden.
The posters also intimated that the respondent was a drunk. No hearing was held prior to the
postings. The Court stated: "The only issue present here is whether the label or characterization
given a person by 'posting,' though a mark of serious illness to some, is to others such a stigma or
badge of disgrace that procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id.
at 436. The Court continued: "[W]here the State attaches a 'badge of infamy' to the citizen, due
process comes into play." Id. at 437.
141. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court stated:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by
the fourth amendment], the term has received much consideration and some of the in-
cluded things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the or-
derly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399 (citations omitted).
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badge of infamy."14 2 This defamation triggers due process not in the ab-
stract, but only where it, in turn, impedes or denies other benefits or privi-
leges which are themselves a protected property interest.1 43 The student-
athlete facing loss of a scholarship and a significant impact on career pos-
sibilities has his or her liberty/property interest encroached upon in a very
real sense,1" and is not within the "mere defamation" category.1 45
Assuming a protected interest exists, what due process procedures are
owed the student-athlete? Although due process is considered a flexible
concept," certain basic notions predominate. A quick response would
suggest that notice and a hearing is necessary when confronted with in-
fringement of protected interests.1 47 But to so state is to give an incomplete
142. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 436.
143. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1975), a photograph of the respondent was circulated
which identified him as an "active shoplifter" although he was never convicted of shoplifting. No
hearing was held prior to the distribution of the flyer. As a result, the respondent was warned by
his employer against any further involvement. The Court held that reputation alone was not a
protected liberty or property interest. Unless the damage to reputation is coupled with an impair-
ment of the ability to exercise some other protected interest, due process protections are not
triggered.
144. The question of whether a student-athlete has a property interest in a future professional
career is an interesting and not thoroughly resolved question. Some cases such as Parish v.
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975), view the mere expectation of a professional career as too
speculative to invoke due process protection. But cases such as Hall v. University of Minnesota,
530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982), present a different, and perhaps more realistic view. In Hall,
the student-athlete, a member of the university basketball team, claimed that he had been rejected
from admission to a degree granting program within the university in bad faith and without due
process. The Court found, after hearing, that the evidence demonstrated that if the student were
not admitted to a program he would not be able to participate on the team and would lose "a
significant opportunity to be a second round choice in the National Basketball Association draft
... thereby acquiring a probable guarantee of his first year compensation as a player .... Id. at
106. The Court continued: "The private interest at stake here, although ostensibly academic, is
the plaintiff's ability to obtain a "no cut" contract with the National Basketball Association." Id.
at 108.
145. There is, however, little support for the notion that a student has a property interest in
intercollegiate competition alone. See Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir.
1978).
146. "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protection as the particular situa-
tion demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
147. The case of Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) represents perhaps the Supreme Court's
first recognition of the application of due process to the educational system. In holding that high
school students facing temporary suspension have a property and liberty interest under the four-
teenth amendment, the Court stated: "At the very minimum... students facing suspension and
the consequent interference with a protected property interest must be given some kind of notice
and afforded some kind of hearing." Id. at 579.
Any doubt as to the application of the Goss principles to state institutions of higher education
was resolved by Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) and Regents of the University
of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985). Both cases recognized the application of Goss to state
universities but limited the impact to instances of disciplinary actions as opposed to "academic"
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response. While the content of adequate notice may readily be known, 4
providing an adequate hearing is much more difficult. Hearings may be
pre-sanction or post-sanction. They may be informal meetings, or they may
be formal adjudicatory events. Because of the sanctions imposed pursuant
to university drug testing programs, it is necessary to examine what type of
hearing will satisfy due process requirements.
A. Timing of Due Process Hearing
A hearing of some form is always required. 49 However, whether a
hearing must be held prior to the denial of or infringement upon the pro-
tected interest is a function of a careful balancing of interest and analysis of
concerns involved. In Mathews v. Eldridge,'5 the Court expressed this bal-
ancing in a three part test:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally re-
quires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private inter-
est that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. 51
Each of these factors requires close examination in the context of a state
university, not only as to whether a pre-sanction hearing must be held, but
also to determine the nature and quality of the hearing if required.
1. Private Interest
The interest of the student in maintaining his or her good reputation,
and a scholarship, if any, is a central concern of due process and the student
alike. Without a "clean" reputation there may very well be no scholarship.
Without a scholarship (for the poorest and often most vulnerable student)
actions, i.e., failure to satisfy academic requirements, although the distinction between the two
often grows thin. See Picozzi, University Disciplinary Process: What's Fair, What's Due, and
What You Don't Get, 96 YALE L.J. 2132 (1987) (actions taken regarding drug use clearly fall into
disciplinary category and whatever procedure that requires).
148. The timing and content of adequate notice is largely a function of accommodating com-
peting interests. Goss, 419 U.S. at 579. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir. 1961), was the first federal case to recognize the application of the due process clause to state
supported colleges. The court found that "notice should contain a statement of the specific
charges and grounds which if proven, would justify expulsion .... " Id. at 158.
149. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974).
150. 424 U.S. 319 (1975).
151. Id. at 335.
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there is no higher educational opportunity, or entrance into the professional
athletic selection system - the draft (at least in football and basketball). 52
In Mathews, the court found that a pre-termination hearing was unnec-
essary because the social security recipient's benefits could be retroactively
granted with no real loss, should he eventually prevail. The student-athlete
may not have a similar ability to be "made whole." If a student is sus-
pended from the team for any length of time, subsequent reinstatement does
not result in an extension of the student's eligibility for intercollegiate play
under most conference or NCAA regulations.1 13 A reinstated scholarship
might, on the surface, appear to adequately restore a lost benefit. However,
if the reinstatement of scholarship is not timely, i.e. sufficiently quick to
allow for the student's education to proceed uninterrupted, then the lost
scholarship may combine with an inability to proceed in school, and would
result in an irreparable lost professional opportunity.
But by far the most irreparable injury is to the student-athlete's reputa-
tion itself and the professional impact that may follow. A student-athlete
once associated with drugs enters a valley of rumors from which he or she
will never emerge whole. The "protection" of confidentiality included in so
many programs is a small shield against the public speculation that flows
from the known fact that the student is no longer a "player." Once soiled,
the student-athlete is a pariah in the selective professional world which is so
dependent on public image and perception.
The private interests are strong but are not the only factors favoring a
pre-sanction hearing. The second prong of the Mathews test, the risk of
erroneous deprivation, is perhaps the greatest factor raising due process
concerns.
2. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
Urinalysis, as conducted by most university drug testing programs,
presents significant risks of error - referred to in scientific parlance as
false-positives and false-negatives. Yet urinalysis is the testing mode of
152. Even without the draft, the taint of association with drugs is enough to effectively de-
stroy a professional sports career. Witness the Canadian Olympian, Ben Johnson. See Fost, Ben
Johnson: World's Fastest Scapegoat, New York Times, October 20, 1988 at A27, col. 3.
In Hall v. University of Minnesota, 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982) the court stated: "The
plaintiff, [a college basketball player], lost existing scholarship rights; he cannot enroll in another
college without sitting out a year of competition under athletic rules." Id. at 107-08. "The privacy
interest at stake here ... is the plaintiff's ability to obtain a "no cut" contract with the National
Basketball Association." Id. at 108.
153. The NCAA, for example, provides that a student has only five years of eligibility and
does not provide for any exception for suspension. See NCAA Bylaw 5-1-(d) (1986).
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choice because it is relatively inexpensive, does not require medical person-
nel in the collection process, and is safer and less intrusive than blood
testing.
The accuracy problems with urinalysis center around the concepts of (1)
sensitivity (what proportion of users are properly detected by the test), (2)
specificity (the ability to properly distinguish nonusers as negatives), and (3)
positive predictive value (the ability to correctly identify users as positives).
Additionally, the ability of drug testing to accurately indicate not only drug
use, but also drug impairment, of the individual within the areas of legiti-
mate concern to the university is also seriously questioned.1 54
The sensitivity, specificity and predictive value level of the most popular
initial screening test (EMIT)" is low, and a disturbing percentage of false-
positives have been noted.I5 6 Ironically, commentators have noted that the
problem increases where the drug use in the subject population drops."5 7
Put simply, the smaller the percentage of drug use within the student-ath-
lete group tested the greater the rate of false-positives. This is particularly
disturbing when it is remembered that despite popular opinion to the con-
trary, drug use among student-athletes is, in many instances, less than that
among non-student-athletes.1 5 8
The problem of the inaccuracy of drug testing and its relationship to
procedural due process, was noted in Jones v. McKenzie 9 where the court
concluded that a hearing prior to termination was required. It is interesting
that even though the inability of urinalysis to measure current impairment
has received some judicial attention, the question that is seldom asked in
university circles is whether cocaine or marijuana use actually significantly
154. That is, if the purpose of drug testing is to identify and eliminate those students whose
performance is impaired or enhanced by drugs, then that rationale would require that testing seek
to measure the degree of such impairment. Despite this obvious goal, most tests do not seek to
control for actual impairment. Instead, programs work on the assumption that any drug use in
the past is currently affecting athletic performance.
155. Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (EMIT), is one of several immunoassay
methods used which employs antibodies to detect drugs. For a further discussion designed for lay
understanding, see Black, supra note 5.
156. See Hanson, Drug Abuse Testing Programs Gaining Acceptance in the Workplace, 64
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEwS 7 (1986).
157. See Lundberg, supra note 5.
158. See W. ANDERSON & D. MCKEAG, SUBSTANCE ABUSE HABITS OF COLLEGE STUDENT
ATHLETES (Institute of Social Research, Michigan State University 1985).
159. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986). In Jones, the court found that an employee (in this
instance, a city school bus driver) could not be dismissed on the basis of a single test. Th2 court
noted that the manufacturer of the EMIT test and the Food and Drug Administration recom-
mended that in light of the risk of inaccuracy, a second confirmatory test employing an alternative
testing method should be used. Id. at 1505-06.
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impairs athletic performance or increases significantly the danger factor
during activity. Although the answer to the latter seems obvious, urinalysis
does not measure current blood levels of intoxication. 160
The use of a confirming second test is the answer to much of any scien-
tific uncertainty that may exist as to false positives. Nevertheless, the qual-
ity and reliability of different tests may leave room for question. 61 These
factors tend to support the need for a more structured procedural due pro-
cess. However, the burden and cost of such procedures is a legitimate con-
cern, and is included in the balancing test.
3. Government Interest - University Burden
The delay and the interference with the day to day functioning of a team
are not factors to be ignored in the due process equation. Certainly the
requirement of a hearing before any sanction is imposed following a "posi-
tive" test would be unworkable for most programs. 62 However, hearings
have not traditionally been required as a matter of due process before the
imposition of any sanctions. Courts have required pre-sanction hearings
primarily where significant, tangible benefits and privileges were in
danger. 16
3
In the context of school administration, Goss v. Lopez rejected a pre-
sanction hearing requirement in regards to temporary suspensions."'
160. The National Institute on Drug Abuse has stated: "The positive results of a urine screen
cannot be used to prove intoxication or impaired performance. Inert drug metabolites may appear
in urine for several days, even weeks (depending upon the drug), without related impairment." See
J. WALSH & R. HAWKS, EMPLOYEE DRUG SCREENING 4 (National Institute on Drug Abuse
1986).
161. See supra note 6.
162. A large athletic program (such as Ohio State's - with 34 intercollegiate teams) would
lose the benefits of immediate action if such a program was forced to provide a hearing prior to the
imposition of counseling following all positive results.
163. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Snidach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969). As Professor Nowak has stated:
A pre-deprivation rather than post-deprivation process should be required wherever there
is an established state procedure that would take a property interest; the state's interest in
destruction of the property in such instances is minimal because the state designed system
should be able to accommodate some procedure for consideration of the individual interest
in the property prior to its deprivation.
NOWAx, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 13.8 n.25 (1986) [hereinafter NoWA,
& YOUNG].
164. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1974), high school students were suspended for discipli-
nary reasons, without a hearing for periods varying up to 10 days. The Supreme Court held that
although students had a protectable due process liberty and property interest, a hearing prior to
suspension was not necessary where the student's presence posed a danger to persons or property.
In such cases, the Court directed that a hearing should follow "as soon as practicable." The
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However, colleges have traditionally provided pre-sanction hearings in dis-
ciplinary matters where the sanction was less than dismissal.165 Goss also
distinguished between sanctions imposed for academic reasons and sanc-
tions imposed as a matter of discipline. 66 A fine line, however, based solely
on dismissal or expulsion is hard to draw. The impact of other sanctions in
drug testing programs can be as, if not more, devastating.
Other sanctions, including the requirement of counseling, can be consid-
ered so grave and intrusive that a pre-sanction hearing may be required,
despite the burden on the university. 6 The various sanctions presented by
the Ohio State program, following a "positive" drug test, present varying
degrees of burden and impediments possibly triggering the need for a pre-
sanction hearing.
B. Removal From All Teams for One Year and Potential
Loss of Scholarship
This sanction involves the loss of intercollegiate play and the possible
loss of scholarship as well as damage to reputation via adverse public per-
ception. The risk of erroneous deprivation of these protected interests 168
within the meaning of the Mathews test, exists in proportion to the danger
of false positives.' 69 It also flows from the possibility of this sanction being
imposed for "non-cooperation." 1 70
The burden of a hearing on the university, within the meaning of Ma-
thews, is the same for all sanctions. 171 While concerns over the health and
safety of the players and the community are often relied on as justification
for drug testing, there has been little evidence to support a contention that
team suspension and scholarship removal without prior hearing is necessary
in order to meet those concerns. While removal from a team and the loss of
a scholarship may not be a university's equivalent of the "death penalty," it
principles of Goss have been applied to Universities as well. See Regents of the University of
Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
165. See Golden, Procedural Due Process for Students at Public Colleges and Universities, 11
J. L. & EDuc. 337, 344 (1982).
166. In Horowitz, the Court limited the Goss decision to suspensions and dismissals that were
the result of inappropriate conduct as opposed to academic failure. The Court reasoned that the
dismissal of a student for academic reasons does not necessitate a hearing because such would
unduly "risk deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the faculty-student relationship." 435
U.S. at 90.
167. See Golden, supra note 165.
168. See supra notes 154-61.
169. See supra note 156.
170. See Appendix.
171. The exception is that costs are increased if the sanction is imposed after expenditures
have already been made concerning previously attempted "lesser" sanctions such as counseling.
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is certainly the exercise of university penal power. At the very least, a pre-
sanction hearing may be required.
C. Suspension for Two Weeks - Conditional Reinstatement
If removal from intercollegiate activity may reasonably trigger reputa-
tion damage and/or loss of demonstrable potential for professional earn-
ing, 1 2 the due process need for a pre-suspension hearing is not limited by a
suspension of two weeks in duration.1 73
D. Mandatory Counseling
The case of Gorman v. University of Rhode Island presents a sobering
view of the significance of the impact of forced counseling.174 However,
considering its context, Gorman presented a situation of required psychiat-
ric counseling without any evidence of disease. Drug testing presents at
least two significant differing factors. First, counseling flowing from a "pos-
itive" test is not a sanction imposed in the type of evidentiary void present
in Gorman - so long as only those who test positive are required to attend
counseling.171 Second, the risk of immediate harm to a drug-user is much
greater, and potentially more devastating (i.e. life threatening) in the short
run, than the type of "quarrelsome" conduct, apparently believed to be evi-
dence of an aberration of thought process in Gorman. Whatever harm may
be generated by an erroneous referral to counseling can be corrected by a
post-sanction hearing so long as confidentiality within the program is main-
tained and suspension from team activity is not present.
Assuming that a hearing is necessary, either as a precedent to the impo-
sition of a sanction to otherwise, certain questions concerning the content of
the hearing still remain.
172. Hall v. University of Minnesota, 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982).
173. In Goss, the Supreme Court found that disciplinary suspensions in public schools of 10
days required a hearing prior to suspension unless a threat to the health and safety of the commu-
nity required otherwise. 419 U.S. at 581.
174. In Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, 646 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1986), a student
sought to enjoin his dismissal from the defendant university. Gorman, a student activist, was
involved in several verbal disputes with administration officials, which gave rise to accusations of
verbal harassing and intimidation. As a result, a student disciplinary panel imposed upon
Gorman the sanction of mandatory psychiatric counseling, and if deemed necessary, treatment.
After granting the plaintiff relief because of the University's failure to provide procedural due
process in the form of a transcript and an impartial panel, the Court went on to state: "[T]he
sanction of compulsory psychiatric treatment is a 'shocking extreme.' An individual has a consti-
tutionally protected right to privacy and this privacy right covers the individual interest in avoid-
ing disclosure of personal matters [and] the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions." Id. at 814 (citing Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)).
175, This of course assumes the validity of the testing process.
1990]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
E. Right to Counsel/Access to Test Sample
The right to a hearing is meaningless without a right to be effectively
heard. 76 Yet the recognition of the right to legal counsel in due process
hearings has had a spotted history.17 7 In the context of due process hear-
ings regarding university disciplinary actions, the courts have often relied
on the principle that "[student] rights in the academic disciplinary process
are not co-extensive with the rights of litigants in a civil trial or with those
of defendants in a criminal trial." '178 While there has been virtually no sup-
port for the notion that there exists a right to appointed counsel, there has
been a split in authority over the question of whether a student may use
counsel of choice, 179 and what role the attorney, if any, plays. 180
The need for counsel in student challenges of drug testing results and/or
sanctions, is greater than the need for counsel in other disciplinary hear-
ings.181 In drug related disciplinary hearings, the possibility of contempora-
neous or subsequent criminal prosecution, with the attendant risk of self
incrimination, looms large. The fact that drug related prosecutions rely
heavily on evidence procured by search, seizure and confession, heightens
the significance of the university process and increases the need and the role
of an attorney for the student.1 82
176. "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
177. The Court, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), found that the interest of welfare
recipients in the uninterrupted receipt of welfare benefits was so strong as to require a pre-termi-
nation hearing. The Court went on to hold that such recipients must be allowed to use retained
counsel. However, the Court stopped short of requiring that counsel be provided at state expense.
Id. at 268-69.
In Goss, the Court "stopped short" of requiring that students be allowed an opportunity to
secure counsel. 419 U.S. at 583. The Court suggested, but did not resolve, that the presence of
counsel may have an adverse impact on the teaching process. See generally Latourette & King,
Judicial Intervention in the Student-University Relationship: Due Process and Contract Theories,
65 U. DET. L. Rnv. 199, 217 (1988).
178. Nash v. Auburn University, 812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987). Even in the presence of
massive deprivation of property/liberty interests, i.e., permanent termination of parental rights,
the Supreme Court has found that due process did not require appointed counsel. See Lassiter v.
Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
179. Note, Due Process Rights in Student Disciplinary Matters, 14 J. C. & U. LAW 359, 373
(1987).
180. Id.
181. In Goss, the Court found that more formal procedures may be required in more difficult
disciplinary cases. 419 U.S. at 584.
182. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975). In Maness, the Court recognized that even
in the context of a civil deposition, counsel had the right and responsibility to advise a client of his
right against self incrimination.
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The use of counsel in disciplinary hearings outside the context of drug
testing is notper se unusual.183 The more difficult problem is to what extent
the student's counsel, or the student if unrepresented, must have access to
any disputed urine sample in order to adequately respond to allegations.
Recognition that the presence of counsel is meaningless unless counsel is
supplied the means to present an adequate defense is not new in the context
of due process.18 4 Yet the question of whether samples taken for scientific
evaluation must be made available is only partially settled. 85
The Supreme Court has suggested, in California v. Trombetta,86 that
the state has no duty to preserve breath samples for defense use because
such evidence does not normally possess exculpatory value,1 87 and compa-
rable evidence might be obtained by other means. In Arizona v. Young-
blood,'88 the Court held that even where such evidence may have
exculpatory value, due process is not violated by the state's failure to pre-
serve so long as the state acts in good faith. Urinalysis, however, does not
fall into the category of breath analysis. Reliability is not firmly established
where methods such as EMIT, or TLC are used.' 89 Assuming a mechanism
exists for preserving urine samples that is not cost prohibitive, due process
may require that the university, in good faith, make available the urine sam-
ple for further testing.'9
183. See Golden, supra note 165, at 344-45. Dean Golden notes that 62.1% of the colleges
surveyed allow for the participation of legal counsel.
184. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the Court recognized that a child had a
due process right to a hearing prior to his transfer from juvenile to adult jurisdiction for trial.
Additionally, the Court held that the child had a right to appointed counsel and that counsel, to
be effective, must have access to social records relied on by the state to justify the transfer. Id. at
562.
185. In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the Court considered the extent to which a
criminal defendant, entitled to appointed counsel as a matter of the sixth amendment, is also
entitled to the expert services of a psychiatrist at state expense in order to adequately put forth an
insanity defense. Pointing out the dangers of an inaccurate resolution of the issue of sanity, the
Court held that the providing of assistance in making a "scientific" defense was essential. Id. at
1094.
186. 467 U.S. 479 (1984). Although also a criminal case, the Court's due process discussion
has implications in a civil context as well. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
187. The Court reasoned that the established accuracy of the intoxilyzer test indicated that
defense testing would merely confirm the previous result. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-90.
188. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 885 (1988).
189. See Hanson, supra note 156.
190. Indeed, if there exists some basis for reasonably concluding that a given test is inaccurate
or that it may provide exculpatory evidence there may be an obligation on the part of the univer-
sity that it make such information available to the student. In a series of cases, the Court has
stated that in criminal prosecutions, as a matter of due process, the state is obligated to disclose
exculpatory or favorable evidence which it may have in its possession. See United States v. Bag-
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F Impartial Hearing Panel/Standard of Proof
A university that conducts and analyzes its own drug tests puts itself in
an awkward, but not necessarily, unconstitutional position. The precepts of
due process have traditionally recognized that "[a]n impartial deci-
sionmaker is a basic constituent of minimum due process." 191 However,
the fact that both investigation of drug use via testing and administrative
review of subsequent determinations may take place within the same uni-
versity or program does not act to deprive the individual of impartiality or
due process.1 92
In any disciplinary hearing pertaining to drug testing, the standard of
proof must at least be that of a preponderance of the evidence. 193 However,
in Smyth v. Lubbers, the court suggested the seriousness of the consequence
can demand a higher standard. 194
The application of due process to the consequences of drug testing at the
college level is inevitable. The extent to which it will apply, and the means
by which it will be implemented, will be decided largely on a case by case
basis, in accordance with the traditional due process analysis.195
VII. PART III - EQUAL PROTECTION IMPLICATIONS OF UNIVERSITY
DRUG TESTING
The decision to subject a segment of the student body, i.e., student ath-
letes, to drug testing, while excluding non-athlete students, raises questions
of equal protection. Discrimination by the state university is not always
illegal or unconstitutional. Only discrimination for legally unacceptable
reasons is proscribed.196
ley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963).
191. Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1079 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Winnick v.
Manning, 460 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1972); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
192. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). Persons involved in the investigation may
actually sit on the hearing panel as long as impartiality can be otherwise insured. See, e.g.,
Hilman v. Elliot, 436 F. Supp. 812 (D.C. Va. 1977); Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 279 F.
Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
193. Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
194. Id. at 799. "However, given the nature of the charges and the serious consequences of
conviction, the court believes the higher standard of 'clear and convincing evidence' may be re-
quired ... the court recommends that the college give serious consideration to adopting the 'clear
and convincing' standard for future cases." Id.
195. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
196. Equal protection under the fourteenth amendment guards against only unreasonable dis-
tinctions. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
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In determining if and when state sponsored discrimination exceeds con-
stitutional boundaries, two standards have developed. The first standard
examines whether the basis for discrimination between similarly situated
individuals or groups is a "suspect classification," requiring strict scrutiny
by the court, 197 or whether the discriminatory scheme impairs a constitu-
tionally protected fundamental interest. If a "suspect classification" or
"fundamental interest" is found to exist, the state has the responsibility198
to show that discriminatory conduct furthers a legitimate, compelling state
interest. 199
The second standard requires that there exists a rational relationship
between the discrimination sought to be justified, and a legitimate state in-
terest which is furthered by the classification. 2" The state interest in avoid-
ing embarrassment and in deterring drug use is certainly legitimate, and
initial statistics would suggest that testing has in fact been effective in fur-
thering these goals. However, whether the "compelling" interest test would
be satisfied is another question.
In the context of student drug testing, classifying students as athlete/
non-athlete is not a "suspect" classification in that it does not share the
characteristics normally associated with such invidious actions. Unlike
race or alienage, the student-athlete status does not involve any immutable,
insular characteristic, traditionally protected. Rather athletics is an option
voluntarily engaged in by the student.
There is perhaps more that can be said about the "real" suspect class
question created by the current approach to random drug testing. While
there does not appear to be supportive empirical data currently available, it
does nonetheless appear to be true that the true focus of random drug test-
ing for cocaine and marijuana, is the Black athlete. Public concern and
university action has sprung primarily from media attention to drug use
among athletes in the area of basketball and football; sports that are dispro-
portionately represented by Black athletes. The athletes "caught," like Len
197. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Suspect classifications have generally
been found to exist where state discrimination was based on immutable characteristics of the
individual such as race or nationality. Carolene Products v. United States, 304 U.S. 134 (1938).
198. However, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court indicated that the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove that a seemingly neutral provision has an impermissible discrim-
inatory effect.
199. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214.
200. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979). The "lesser" standard of rational relationship has
traditionally been applied to classification schemes among student-athletes and between student-
athlete and non-student-athletes. See Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th
Cir. 1974) (upheld the NCAA rule setting the minimum grade point average necessary for eligibil-
ity); see also Jones v. Wichita State Univ., 698 F.2d 1082 (10th Cir. 1983).
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Bias, have predominately been Black. While race certainly does not entitle
or excuse an athlete in the use of illegal drugs, it may well play a role in the
willingness to invade protected interest.01
If, in fact, the focus of a university drug testing program will be on
sports in which Black athletes predominate, then is a hidden suspect class
created requiring the strictest of scrutiny?20 2 The notion of disparate im-
pact has received recognition in cases of racial discrimination under Title
VII.20° For equal protection, however, proof of disparate impact alone i.e.,
Non-Whites affected disproportionately, is not sufficient. 2°4 Thus, despite
the particularly disproportionate burden of drug testing scrutiny that may
be borne by the Black athlete, it is unlikely that the administration of the
testing program will ever produce the evidence of intent necessary to satisfy
an equal protection claim. Suspect classifications, based on race, are there-
fore not a particularly profitable analytic tool in this instance.
While the question of "suspect" classification may be easy to resolve,
the problem of whether a fundamental interest sufficient to trigger strict
scrutiny is involved, is another matter.20 5 Fundamental rights, for purposes
of equal protection, are generally considered to be those rights which are
"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. ' 2 6 In that con-
text, fourth amendment protection associated with the search of the person
via drug testing would appear, as a matter of logic, to be the type of guaran-
teed right protected by the more stringent test of equal protection analysis.
However, "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence." 207 Experience has demonstrated that state action "which classify
201. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
202. Note that to some extent Ohio State avoids this problem by planning to test all student-
athletes, in all sports programs. See Appendix. However, to the extent that administration of the
program results in more frequent testing in football and basketball (presumably because of their
high visibility), the disparate impact may still occur.
203. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
204. In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court held
that disparate impact alone was insufficient to show that the defendants' rezoning denial violated
equal protection. Despite evidence that the racial impact of the defendants' actions was kmown,
the Court held that equal protection requires proof of discriminatory intent. Discriminatory in-
tent may be shown by such factors as disproportionate impact, the historical background of the
challenged decision, the specific antecedent events, departures from normal procedures, and con-
temporary statements of the decisionmakers. Id. at 264-68.
205. Although the concept of "strict scrutiny" in instances of infringement of "fundamental
rights" has been ingrained in our analytical doctrine for years, see Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971); Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); and Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), how fundamental rights are determined for purposes of equal
protection is less than clear.
206. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1972).
207. O.W. HOLMES, COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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persons in terms of their abilities to exercise rights which have specific rec-
ognition in the first eight amendments do not generally arise as equal pro-
tection issues." 208 Rather, such actions are normally challenged as a
"violation of the specific guarantee without any need to resort to equal pro-
tection analysis. 2 °9 One exception, that might ostensibly be of significance
in the context of state university sanctioned drug testing, is the possibility
that such conduct may infringe upon fundamental rights of privacy consti-
tutionally protected by the equal protection clause, independent of the am-
bit of the fourth amendment.
The right to privacy has found its place among those small lists of fun-
damental rights which invoke strict scrutiny analysis. 210 However, privacy
recognition for equal protection purposes has centered around issues of per-
sonal choice in matters of personal lifestyle. The use of "recreational"
drugs (cocaine and marijuana) which is the focus of much of the modem
drug testing effort, is unlikely to be afforded the constitutional protection of
privacy as a matter of personal choice.211 Assuming a lack of fundamental
interest, the segregating of athlete from non-athlete for purposes of drug
testing, does not violate equal protection.21 2
VIII. CONCLUSION
The student-athlete often exists in a fishbowl world of public scrutiny.
His or her every activity becomes food for public consumption. When stu-
dents in this public light fall victim to the lure of a societal vice such as
drugs, the public often feels betrayed and outraged by the gladiator's fall
from grace. The concern generated by athlete drug use is thus both one of
disapproval of lifestyle and a need to mold change.
In this, the beginning of the 1990s, public sentiment against drug use
has manifested itself by marking the drug user, not as a victim but as a
perpetrator. Moreover, there is a firmly held notion among many that drug
use is a matter of free choice, and as such all one need do is "just say no."
208. NOWAK & YOUNG, supra note 163, at 782. "In these instances the denial of the right to
one class of persons is likely to be held a violation of the specific guarantee without any need to
resort to equal protection analysis." Id.
209. Id.
210. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
211. However, the question is very much alive where broad spectrum drug testing programs
test for wide ranges of legal as well as illegal substances. An individual right to personal choice
regarding over-the-counter products and legally prescribed medicines may very well create a pri-
vacy interest sufficient to invoke strict scrutiny.
212. See Moreland v. Western Pa. Interscholastic, 572 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1978).
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In this context, random drug testing serves the purpose of deterrence
through fear of detection.
Society pays a price as well as receives a benefit from random drug test-
ing. Basic principles concerning the sanctity of privacy and the necessity of
due process are strained by programs such as Ohio State's. The testing of
student-athletes at state universities represents a significant expansion of
governmental intervention which goes far beyond concerns for public
safety. The relative unimportance of athletics in comparison to law en-
forcement or public transportation makes it hard to justify such intrusions
on grounds of strong governmental interest. Still, it would be naive to sug-
gest that the state will or should turn its back to this serious social problem.
What is needed, however, is not uncontrolled urination on demand but
comprehensive education and disciplined control of illicit sources.
The acceptability of random testing of student-athletes should not be
judged by the lack of student outcry or publicly expressed indignation. The
student-athlete exists on campus only so long as financial resources are
made available and "playing time" is allowed. Under such circumstances,
the student is in the worst position to denounce the invasion of his or her
rights and will wisely accept such action with silence.
While cases such as Von Raab and Skinner may indicate judicial toler-
ance of drug testing, it should not be assumed that such tolerance is unlim-
ited. Grave issues still remain concerning the fourth amendment
implications of random drug testing. Governmental invasion of the rest-
room must of necessity and social sensibilities, have limits. Requiring that
at least some level of suspicion exists before state intrusion into so private a
function as urination is not impractical or unreasonable. Articulable stan-
dards for determining suspicion exists and can be used without causing the
destruction of athletic programs. As suggested by the facts in Von Raab
and Skinner, technological advances may reduce the need for the significant
intrusion privacy occasioned by direct observation of urination.
Due process is a concept that requires more than mere lip service. A
realistic understanding of the student-athlete makes it clear that he or she
has much to lose. The damage that can be caused by the identification of
the student-athlete with drug use, is serious and irreparable, regardless of
whether such an association is rightfully or wrongly made. To assure due
process, universities must do more than is currently being done. More re-
sources will need to be spent on assuring accuracy and reviewability of test
results. Such costs may well force universities to reconsider whether the
benefit of drug testing is worth that cost.
Finally, it is important to remember that the path to hell is often strewn
with good intentions. The desire to force students to do what is goed for
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them may mask the greater societal harm of destroyed personal integrity
and individual rights. Loss of privacy, dignity and reputation, is too high a
price to ask the student-athlete to pay.
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IX. APPENDIX
On July 25, 1986, the Ohio State University sent to all parents and/or
guardians of Ohio State student-athletes the following program description
together with a consent form which all athletes were required to read and
sign.
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
Department of Intercollegiate Athletics
Drug Education and Testing Program
1986-87
The Department of Intercollegiate Athletics of the Ohio State University
firmly believes that the use of drugs and alcohol can have a negative effect
on the performance of the student athlete, both in the classroom and in
sports. This program is designed to deal with this critical area.
A. Purpose of Drug Testing
Although educational efforts will continue to be a major thrust of the
department, a program of testing of the urine of student athletes will be
undertaken as an adjunct to this program. The purpose of drug testing is as
follows: (1) To serve as a deterrent to drug or alcohol use by the athlete; (2)
To identify athletes who are addicted to substances; (3) To promote educa-
tion and arrange treatment for the athlete who needs help; (4) To protect
the integrity of the Ohio State University.
Every attempt has been made to protect the rights of the individual stu-
dent athlete and the institution.
B. Method of Drug Testing
All student athletes shall be informed in writing about the drug testing
program. A copy of this program will be given to the student athlete and a
copy sent to each parent or guardian.
The Team Physician shall explain to the members of each squad the
procedures of the drug testing program and answer any questions. A con-
sent form for testing of urine samples and authorization for limited release
of information shall be given to each athlete to sign.
Tests will be primarily conducted for drugs of abuse, such as amphet-
amines, cannabinoids (substances contained in marijuana), cocaine, and
other controlled substances. They may also include procedures to detect
anabolic steroids and other so-called performance enhancing drugs. All
tests will be performed on urine.
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The testing may be announced or unannounced. Urine will be collected
by professional personnel and will be numbered. The trainer will match the
individual player with a master list that is prepared so that the signature of
the athlete will correspond with the number on the specimen bottle. The
specimen will be transported to the clinical laboratory at Ohio State Univer-
sity Hospital, where the director of the laboratory will proceed with the
testing. The master list of numbered urine will be given to the Head Team
Physician. He and he alone will know the identification of the individual
athlete. Refusal to provide a urine specimen will be considered a positive
test result.
C. Dealing with Positive Tests
If the results of the urine tests are positive, these results will be given to
the Team Physician by number. The Team Physician will inform the ath-
lete of the presence of a substance in his or her urine. The Team Physician
will advise the athlete of the nature of the substance and the health hazards
involved.
The Team Physician will have the authority, under the consent form, to
privately advise the Head Coach, Head Trainer, Drug Counselor, or other
necessary athletic staff personnel of the nature and extent of the substances
present in his/her system.
Drugs banned for use by the student-athlete will be divided into three
categories. Sanctions will be imposed differently in each of these groups.
GROUP A
Marijuana and Hashish (THC)
(Street names: grass, pot, weed, tea, Mary Jane)
GROUP B
Stimulants - Amphetamines, Ritalin and related compounds.
(Street names: uppers, pep pills, bennies, dexies, speed)
Depressants - Methaqualone, barbiturates, diazepam and related
compounds.
(Street names: downers, stumblers, ludes, sopors, red devils, yellow
jackets and rainbows)
Hallucinogens - LSD, PCP, Mescaline and related compounds.
(Street names: acid, scramblers, mind benders)
Anabolic Steroids - Winstrol, Dianabol, Deca-Durabolin and related
compounds.
GROUP C
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Cocaine and Heroin SANCTIONS TO BE IMPOSED IN THE CASE
OF POSITIVE TESTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
GROUP A - THC
First Positive
1. Probation
2. The Head Coach will be informed of the results of the test.
3. The Team Physician will discuss the positive test with the student-
athlete. If the athlete admits to a problem with the substance he/
she will be referred to a drug counselor. If the athlete refuses coun-
seling or denies a problem with the substance, weekly urine tests
will be instituted and continued for the remainder of their career.
Those athletes going directly to counseling will also be tested
weekly.
4. There will be no sanction imposed
Second Positive - (any drug in groups A, B, or C)
1. Intrasquad discipline by the Head Coach. This will vary from sport
to sport but will involve some punishment which will be meaningful
to the athlete.
2. Counseling is mandatory.
3. Drug tests will be performed weekly for the remainder of the career
of the athlete.
Third Positive - (any drug in groups A, B, or C)
1. Immediate suspension from the squad (minimum of 2 weeks).
2. Evaluation by a Drug Counselor and regular attendance to
whatever program is suggested.
3. Reinstatement can be considered after a period of time but also
must be approved by the Head Coach, Team Physician and Direc-
tor of Athletics.
4. Weekly drug tests for the remainder of the athletic career.
Fourth Positive - (any drug in groups A, B, or C)
1. Removal from the squad for a minimum of one year. Financial aid
may be continued as long as the athlete follows certain guidelines
(attendance at class, continued drug testing and continued drug
counseling).
GROUP B - Stimulants, Depressants, Hallucinogens & Anabolic
Steroids
First Positive
1. The Coach will be informed of the results of the test.
2. Major intrasquad discipline shall be imposed by the Head Coach.
3. Drug counseling is mandatory.
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4. Weekly drug testing will be done for the career of the athlete.
Second Positive - (any drug in groups A, B, or C)
1. Immediate suspension from the squad (minimum of 2 weeks).
2. Evaluation by a Drug Counselor and regular attendance to
whatever program is suggested.
3. Reinstatement can be considered after a period of time but must be
approved by the Head Coach, Team Physician and Director of
Athletics.
4. Weekly drug tests for the remainder of the athletic career.
Third Positive - (any drug in groups A, B, or C)
1. Removal from the squad for a minimum of one year. Financial aid
may be continued as long as the athlete follows certain guidelines
(attendance at class, continued drug testing and continued drug
counseling).
GROUP C - Cocaine and Heroin
First Positive
1. Immediate suspension from the squad (minimum of 2 weeks).
2. Evaluation by a Drug Counselor and regular attendance to
whatever program is suggested.
3. Reinstatement can be considered after a period of time but must be
approved by the Head Coach, Team Physician and Director of
Athletics.
4. Weekly drug tests for the remainder of the athletic career.
Second Positive - (any drug in groups A, B, or C)
1. Removal from the squad for a minimum of one year. Financial aid
may be continued as long as the athlete follows certain guidelines
(attendance at class, continued drug testing and continued drug
counseling).
Any athlete who does not report regularly for weekly testing or misses a
counseling session will be subject to suspension or dismissal. It is possible
that a formal drug rehabilitation program (in-patient) will be recommended
for the athlete. The Athletic Department will be recommended for the ath-
lete. The Athletic Department will encourage and be supportive of the stu-
dent-athlete's participation in appropriate drug treatment but cannot
assume financial responsibility for this treatment.
We strongly urge that parents avail themselves of the University insur-
ance program which assumes some of the expense for illness and injury not
athletically related. (See Student-Handbook).
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The Department of Intercollegiate Athletics will make every effort to
keep test results confidential except as provided above and will oppose dis-
closure thereof to any persons within or outside the University.
D. General Principles
(1) As a required condition for any student to be a member of an Ohio
State varsity intercollegiate athletic team, he/she must agree to participate
in the Athletic Department's Drug Testing Program. Such monitoring is
considered an extension of the ongoing physical examination of our athletes
and is in the best interests of both the students and the University to con-
duct a reasonably comprehensive Drug Testing Program.
(2) At a minimum, all Ohio State varsity athletic teams shall be tested
four times annually.
(3) All positive test results are considered cumulative for the career of the
Ohio State student-athlete.
(4) Any drug not specifically listed on the penalty chart is subject to clas-
sification by the team physician for inclusion on the chart.
Any exception to the above regulation must be authorized by the Direc-
tor of Athletics.
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CONSENT TO TESTING OF URINE SAMPLES
AND
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION
To: TEAM PHYSIcIANS
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
COLUMBUS, OHIO 43210
I hereby acknowledge that I received a copy of The Ohio State University
Intercollegiate Athletics Drug Education Program. I further acknowledge
that I have read said program, and that I understand the provisions of the
program.
In consideration for the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athlet-
ics at The Ohio State University, I am entering into this the terms of this
consent and authorization.
I do hereby give my consent to have a sample of my urine collected during
the school of 1986-87, and testing for the presence of certain drugs or sub-
stances in accordance with the provisions of The Ohio State University In-
tercollegiate Athletics Drug Testing Program. I also consent to have a
sample of my urine collected and tested at such other times as analysis test-
ing is required under the program during the academic year. I further au-
thorize you to act as my physician for the limited purpose of conducting
analysis testing under the program and agree that you may make a confi-
dential release of the results of the testing to the head athletic trainer at The
Ohio State University; my parent(s) or legal guardian; the head coach of
any intercollegiate sport of which I am a member; and the athletic director
of The Ohio State University. To the extent set forth in this document, I
waive any privilege I might have in connection with such information.
I understand any urine samples will be sent to the Clinical Laboratory at
The Ohio State University Hospital, for actual testing.
In consideration for the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athlet-
ics at The Ohio State University, I also release from legal responsibility or
liability The Ohio State University, its Board of Trustees, its officers, em-
ployees, representatives, and agents for the release of such information and
records as authorized by this form.
Signature Date
Name (Please Print)
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